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Abstract
“All politics is local.”- Tip O’Neill
This dissertation targets three questions relating to local public finance.
Given the importance of local public finance on the average person’s everyday
life (consider the state of local roads and schools), understanding economic
elements associated with local revenue generation are integral to our knowledge
of how municipalities can affect their local fiscal situation. To this end, three
essays are provided here to consider two major topics; capitalization effects, and
local budget composition issues.
The first two chapters discuss how local public services, in particular fire
stations, police stations, and hospitals, can impact the value of nearby land. In
particular, the first chapter concentrates on how single family home values will,
on average, decrease in value if they are located too close to these emergency
service stations, but can also decrease in value if they are located too distantly.
Understanding these effects and modeling them are the targets of the first essay.
Incorporating similar ideas, the second chapter utilizes the same stations,
but now tackles the question of how these services can affect non-residential
structures such as office buildings, retail centers, and manufacturing plants. Of
interest here is the large heterogeneity of land use, leading to concerns over
prior research and its tendency to aggregate land uses when considering these
capitalization effects.
The final chapter utilizes fiscal override and budget data to analyze how
changes in local budget composition can be driven by fiscal overrides in revenue
constrained municipalities. When communities are fiscally constrained in their
viii
ability to raise own-source revenue, local budget officials may be incentivized to
use voter approved fiscal overrides and local budget fungibility to drive expen-
ditures into different portions of the budget. Findings suggest that local budget
composition tends to favor certain kinds of spending, such as public works, over
other types such as education.





Economists have long been interested in understanding how public services are
capitalized into property values. This paper enhances an understanding of cap-
italization effects from three largely ignored types of public services; fire, police,
and emergency medical services (EMS). To examine these effects, a database of
over 3 million home sales throughout the state of Florida is utilized. The data
covers an 18 year period from 1994 to 2011. Using Geographical Information
System (GIS) software, a variety of distance measures are calculated for each
residential parcel.
Economic theory suggests that the value of a property depends in part on the
services and amenities that are available to its tenants (Oates, 1969). Oates’
work established critical linkages between service provision and property val-
ues. For example, residents that value open space may prefer (and thus be
willing to pay for) land adjacent to parks or preserved land. Previous work has
also suggested that residents may value locations near schools or transportation
hubs. These amenity effects translate into higher housing values for those areas
with better access to such services. Evidence also suggests that these premia
dissipate with distance as the quality of service provision falls.
Fire, police, and EMS services are also generally accepted as valuable public
amenities, and as such, they should exhibit similar spatial positive capitalization
effects. However, these services generate an inherent economic tension. On one
1
hand, locating near a fire station ensures a faster response time and in turn, re-
duced fire-related losses. Insurance companies have long been known to provide
cheaper insurance for properties with nearby fire stations, lowering an important
cost to homeowners (Brueckner, 1981). Similarly, police and medical services’
locations can determine their response time to crimes or health emergencies
emergencies.1 In essence, the quality of service such public goods provide is a
function of the distance required to respond to emergency situations. Hence,
services such as these contain a strong spatial component. However, there are
also disamenities associated with close proximity to service stations. These ser-
vices may generate increased traffic congestion, noise and air pollution, and
often times are clad with unappealing faades. Such undesirable characteristics
should be negatively capitalized into nearby housing values (Van Praag and
Baarsma, 2005) and (McMillen, 2004). Given the opposing directions of these
competing economic effects, one would expect the creation of something akin to
a “Goldilock’s Zone” wherein the property valuation is maximized with respect
to each service location.2
The impact of the proximity of these three public services on home prices
using hedonic regression techniques will be considered herein. Of particular
interest is the nature of the spatial component of service valuation. As such,
the analysis will explore the relationship between housing and service prox-
imity. Analyses for other public services commonly use straight-line distance
calculations between points as the measure of proximity. An additional nuance
here investigates whether there exists a difference between using straight-line
distance and actual driving distance. Drive distance analysis using a network
analysis should better capture the response times that are critical in determin-
1See Blackwell and Kaufman (2002) and Pons et al. (2005)
2For a more technical discussion of these effects see Appendix A.
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ing emergency service provision. Finally, a difference-in-difference (DID) model
identifying effects based solely on the construction of 785 new service facilities
during the sample period will be conducted.
Several interesting results have been identified. Aggregate measures of each
of the three major types of services are found to have a ‘hill’ shape with respect
to distance. In other words, housing prices tend to be positively correlated with
station distance out to a specific distance. In each case, capitalization effects
become negatively correlated with station distance beyond this inflection points.
These results are relatively robust to several measures of distance and parcel
choice. Additionally, the difference-in-difference analysis largely corroborates
the general regression findings. Finally, the methodology and measurements
established here can be utilized to investigate other economic questions.3
1.1 Literature Review
Capitalization effects have traditionally focused on three types of publicly pro-
vided amenities; education4 , open-space5, and transportation6. The prior re-
search provides a series of perspectives on how to consider the impact of emer-
gency service access. The following examples of the literature are representative
of prior research in the capitalization field, but by no means is an exhaustive
list.
Much literature has been written on the effects of transportation and nearby
3One such possibility may be studies on airports. Closer locations may benefit from having
quick access to the airport, but closer proximity will increase noise pollution from overhead
air traffic.
4See also Kain and Quigley (1970), Bogart and Cromwell. (1997), and Cheshire and Shep-
pard (2004)
5See also Correll, Lillydahl and Singell (1978), Irwin and Bockstael (2001), and Walsh
(2007).
6See also Bollinger and Ihlanfeldt (1997) and Ihlanfeldt (2001).
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housing prices. Early work by Spengler (1930) demonstrated the positive effects
that transportation access has on residential property values. Using New York
real estate data, Spengler found that an increased distance from transporta-
tion access was correlated with lower property values. Bollinger and Ihlanfeldt
(1997) showed the effects of Atlanta’s MARTA rail expansion on population and
employment growth. The authors found positive benefits related to station con-
struction. One difference between their research and the work presented here
is the unit of analysis. While Bollinger and Ihlanfeldt used census tract level
data for their study, parcel level data is used here, providing a finder level of de-
tail. This paper also contributes to the capitalization literature by considering
a different set of services.
As noted by Ihlanfeldt (2001), there have been relatively few studies ac-
counting for the negative externalities associated with extremely close service
location, as most studies only estimate a single averaged effect over all ‘nearby’
parcels of land. This led to a number of conflicting results, as locations with
negative spillover effects likely offset the expected positive effects from locating
at a slightly further distance away from the service. His contribution recognized
that having a metro rail station in the immediate vicinity provided positive ben-
efits to residents, but also generated negative spillovers through noise, pollution,
and possibly increased crime rates. Using a hedonic regression, he found that
housing prices within a quarter mile of a station were 19% lower than those more
than three miles away. However, housing prices between one and three miles
from the station were significantly higher compared to the nearest and most
distant groups. Hence, this study provides initial evidence of a “Goldilock’s”:
phenomenon for public transportation services. On the other hand, Redfearn
(2009) shows evidence against capitalization effects of light rail transportation.
4
One of the primary subjects of study in the literature has been the capital-
ization effects of educational services. Chin and Foong (2006) used four years
of home sales in Singapore to evaluate the effects of schools on nearby housing
values. Recognizing that distance is not the only way to measure service ac-
cessibility, the authors create a measurement of school accessibility by utilizing
testing scores and open admission slots. They find that schools with higher
test scores as well as better access tend to raise higher housing values in local
neighborhoods. Weimer and Wolkoff (2001) also demonstrate the positive ef-
fect that school quality has on local housing prices. They exploit the fact that
public school districts and elementary school enrollment areas do not perfectly
overlap, allowing identification within hedonic regression using 1997 sales data
in Monroe County, New York. Similarly, they find that high quality schools
lead to higher housing prices.
Open-space amenity valuations have been researched as well. Shultz and
King (2001) use census block level data to derive residential valuations of open
space in Tucson, Arizona. They find a positive and significant effect of locating
near open-space amenities, even at the census block level. Irwin (2002) adds
to the literature by identifying that valuations of open space may differ based
on the type of open space (i.e. whether it is zoned park, undeveloped land,
or protected forestland) in Maryland. Her study uncovers a significant and
positive valuation placed on permanently preserved land compared to land that
may be developed in the future. Anderson and West (2006) question whether
high density or high income locations provide a different valuation of open space
than other neighborhoods. Their results suggest that there may be asymmetric
capitalization effects leading the authors to note that “...a metropolitan area’s
average value may substantially overestimate or underestimate the value of open
5
space in particular neighborhoods.”
Another contribution to this literature comes from Matthew’s (2006) the-
sis on the effect of commercial and retail locations on neighboring residential
property values. He uses hedonic regressions combined with a novel system of
identifying neighborhood layouts to derive the distances over which disamenity
effects may be present from the commercial structures. Matthews found neg-
ative capitalization effects out to 250 feet, with generally positive effect from
250 to 1,000 feet. His work also addresses the possibility of non-linear spatial
effects on property values. Grislain-Letrmy and Katossky (2014) demonstrates
the negative effect of disamenities on local housing. They analyze homes in
three French cities, finding reduced home values when people are exposed to
nearby hazardous industrial facilities.
This study enhances the literature in several ways. First, it uses parcel-level
data instead of the more aggregated data seen in most prior studies. Second,
it considers three important services not previously given attention. Third,
the length and breadth of the data set enables a refined difference-in-difference
identification strategy keying on new facility construction, and advantage that
is rarely present in previous studies.
The work presented here will add to the existing literature by focusing on
two additional considerations; the use of parcel-level data and the inclusion of
three types of services not examined in the past. Each of these inclusions will
help address some of the gaps that exist in the service capitalization literature.
6
Table 1.1: Select summary statistics using Euclidean distance measures.
Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Sales Price ($) 3309888 198127 244894 10004 14500000
Living Area (sq. ft) 3309888 2066 906.81 101 45068
Lot Size (sq. m) 3309888 1312 3920 100 2199091
Age (years) 3309888 19.05 17.99 1 111
In City (dummy) 3309888 0.46 0.50 0 1
Elementary Distance (m) 3309888 1574 1699 0.69 36721
Distance to CBD (m) 3309888 19984 12792 0 60530
Euclidean Hospital Distance (m) 3309888 7228 5813 25.55 63160
Euclidean Fire Distance (m) 3309888 2438 1683 0.47 25376
Euclidean Police Distance (m) 3309888 4221 3391 2.78 44638
Network Hospital Distance (m) 3273202 9755 7325 12.02 91623
Network Fire Distance (m) 3273202 3615 2447 0.07 40448
Network Police Distance (m) 3273202 5922 4504 0.54 60136
1.2 Data
The data used for this analysis comes from four main sources; the Florida De-
partment of Revenue (FLDOR), the Florida Division of Emergency Manage-
ment (FLDEM), the University of Florida GeoPlan Center (UFGC), and the
U.S. Census Bureau. The breadth of the data includes the entire state of Florida,
and much of it comes at the parcel level. The data covers the 18 year period be-
tween 1994 and 2011. Selected summary statistics of the data using Euclidean
and Network distance measures are presented in Table 1.1.7
The Florida DOR, in conjunction with the DeVoe Moore Center at Florida
State University, provided tax roll data at the parcel level for each of the 18
sample years. This database contains information on every parcel in the state
of Florida. Information on sales price and date, building age, land use clas-
sification, number of living units, and interior living space are all included in
the dataset. The DOR also provided GIS data on the location of each parcel.
Using ESRI’s ArcGIS program, it is possible to generate lot sizes and various
7The discrepancy in observation numbers comes from the inability of the GIS program
to calculate distances for the Network analysis if there are no nearby roads. Thus, a small
number of largely rural parcels with no road access according to information provided by the
U.S. Census Bureau were removed from the Network analysis.
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distance measures using this data. Each parcel’s unique parcel ID was used to
merge the GIS location data with the tax roll data. Due to historical parcel ID
changes, eight counties8 are not retained in the dataset. Table 1.2 contains a
list of included counties.





Bradford Hardee Palm Beach
Brevard Hendry Pasco
Broward Hernando Pinellas
Calhoun Indian River Polk
Charlotte Jackson Putnam
Citrus Jefferson Saint Johns











An important note is that historical GIS data is not available regarding
parcel locations over the period of study. As such, parcels that did not exist as
of 2011 are not included in the analysis. Given the relative stability of parcel
existence (only merging or demolition/reconstruction with land use change is
likely to remove parcels from the database), this restriction affected less than
3% of the parcels originally contained in the tax rolls. Data for emergency
8These are; Escambia, Highlands, Hillsborough, Holmes, Levy, Liberty, Santa Rosa and
Volusia.
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service stations comes from the FLDEM. They have furnished a database with
the GIS location information for 1,917 fire stations, 992 police stations, and 483
hospitals.9 The data include information on the type of station, its location,
and in the case of the hospital data, number of beds and hospital operation type
(i.e. public, private, or not-for-profit). Hospitals are the least common and most
concentrated in urban areas. Many rural counties have only a single hospital
facility to serve their region. The geographic coverage of fire and police stations
is far more extensive. Fire stations especially are widely scattered and numerous
compared to EMS. All three services display agglomeration tendencies in urban
areas, thus indicating the importance of controlling for central business district
effects.
As one might expect, not all fire stations, police stations, or hospitals are
the same. As in many states with both urban and rural populations, publicly
funded fire stations and volunteer fire departments are each utilized. The state
has 1,592 staffed fire stations primarily in urban areas. The 298 volunteer fire
departments are mainly located in more rural locations. One might expect
the capitalization effects of being near a (likely better funded) professional fire
station to differ from a volunteer fire department. Similarly, police substations
are likely to have a different effect compared to sheriff’s departments (which
are likely smaller and have fewer resources) or headquarters buildings. As such,
two of the three main categories of services were split into subgroups to look for
potentially differential effects. Fire stations were split into standard publicly
funded fire stations and volunteer departments. The police stations were split
into four major categories; police substations, headquarters buildings, sheriff
offices, and state or federal buildings such as Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
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Figure 1.3: Location of all emergency medical facilities.
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(ATF), Department of Fish & Wildlife (DFW), secret service, highway patrol,
and customs agencies. Distances from each subtype of station were calculated
for all parcels (providing 7 different distance measures) as well as a distance
measure to the nearest station of the three major types regardless of the subtype
(providing another 3 distance measures).
GIS coastline data was also provided through the UFGC. However, due to
computational constraints, exact distance measures are not feasible.10 Instead,
a dummy variable system has been used to create categories or bins of distance.
Measures were taken within 5, 25, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 2000 meters.
Parcels were placed into one of these bins. Those not within 2,000 meters of
the coast were given their own bin as well.
As Kain and Quigley (1970) noted, housing values tend to increase at a non-
linear rate when approaching central business districts of large metropolitan
areas. To control for this tendency, parcel distance to central business districts
(CBD) was gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD). The LEHD was used to identify the highest em-
ployment centers in each of the Census designated Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA). The distance for each parcel was then calculated to find the distance to
CBD measure.
The UFGC provided a database on 7,423 schools in Florida which includes
pupil-teacher ratios, grade coverage, ownership type, reduced or free lunch en-
rollments, and school location. In order to account for school effects, two mea-
sures will be used, one for school quality, and a second for distance to the
school. As noted by Weimer and Wolkoff (2001) and others, elementary school
10More specifically, the coastal GIS maps are extraordinarily detailed. However, the more
detailed a map is, the longer it takes to calculate the required distance measures. By reducing
the number of vertex points in the coastal map, the calculations could have been performed
more quickly. Unfortunately, this also causes inaccuracy in the reported measures.
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performance tends to be highly correlated with other local school performance
measures, (i.e. upper grade outcomes) as well. As such, to account for local
schools, each residential parcel will have a distance measure calculated for the
nearest elementary school.11 Individual school quality will be controlled for us-
ing a set of school-specific dummy variables. Given that the quality of education
that a student receives will, on average, be the same across all students in the
school’s catchment zone, school-specific dummy variables should capture any
variation in school quality from one elementary school to the next.
1.3 Theory
Importantly, there are reasons to believe the identified economic tension of
amenity versus disamenity effects may not have equivalent magnitudes at var-
ious distance measures. For negative capitalization effects, there are two main
contributing factors; noise pollution and traffic congestion. Both of these com-
ponents generate effects displaying a dependence on distance. The effect of
sound attenuation (a change in amplitude or α) can be described by Stokes’




Where η is the viscosity coefficient of the medium, ω is the frequency of the
sound, ρ is the density of the medium, and V is the speed of sound through air.
11Exact school catchment zones in a usable GIS format were unable to be obtained for the
entire state, although some counties were available. Fortunately, most parcels are in the same
catchment zone as the nearest elementary school, so these distance measures also provide a
way of uncovering to which elementary school a parcel is most likely attached.
12The amplitude of a given soundwave is directly related to the intensity of the sound.
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Given the assumption that the atmosphere will be fairly homogeneous between
the point of origination (the emergency vehicle’s siren), and the point of hearing
(the observed parcel), α will become a constant value irrespective of a sound’s
distance traveled. The attenuation rate can then be plugged into the formula
for sound propagation through a homogeneous medium:
A(d) = A0e
−αd with α, d, A0, > 0








A(d) represents the amplitude of a sound wave at d distance from the source
of origination with initial amplitude A0. As can be seen, for any marginal in-
crease in distance the amplitude of an originating sound will decline non-linearly
with respect to distance traveled. The amplitude will eventually approach 0
given a long enough traveling distance.13 Given that human hearing has a lower
threshold, there exists a distance from which a human would be unable to hear
any sound waves of a given initial amplitude from the point of origination. At
13Mathematically, the amplitude has a horizontal asymptote along the X-axis. However,
since the transmission of a sound wave requires the transferring of energy from one set of
air molecules to another, the loss of energy from this transmission will eventually result in
the air molecule’s movements being effectively indistinguishable from background movement.
This may most easily be imagined by dropping a stone into a lake. The waves will diminish
in height as they propagate through the water. Eventually the wave heights will become
indistinguishable from the natural tendency of the water’s surface to move.
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this point, the assumption is made that if the human ear can no longer hear the
noise, then the effect on utility would be neutral, i.e. 0.
The utility (U ) derived from a location’s noise profile will then be a function
of the following variables:14
U(d,A0, η, ω, ρ, V, α) = c
1
A(d)
If we assume that noise is an economically undesirable trait of a given loca-




Provided that the amplitude of sound waves exhibits a tendency to decline
at a diminishing rate, the related utility should follow a similar tendency, thus




The negative capitalization effects from traffic will largely be dependent upon
the likelihood of encountering a road or intersection with an oncoming emer-
gency vehicle. Since a station’s non-trivial effect on nearby traffic is through
drivers requiring to give way for emergency vehicles with sirens active, consid-
eration must be made for how often this is likely to occur to a driver. Assuming
that the majority of emergency vehicles are leaving directly from the station,
then the most highly traveled location for a station will be the immediate vicin-
14Since A(d) is an economic ‘bad ‘, an individual’s utility will increase as perceived noise
levels decrease, thus leading to the inclusion of A(d) as an inverse component in the utility
function.
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ity, with farther locations receiving relatively less emergency traffic.15
To illustrate this relationship, consider a circle of radius r centered around
an emergency facility. This circle encompasses all roads inside its area. As the
circle’s radius increases, more roads and intersections fall into its area. With
more roads and intersections residing inside the circle, the likelihood of any
random driver encountering an emergency vehicle will fall. This occurs due to
the following relationship; that as the radius of an imaginary circle around a







Given this relationship, for any increase in distance from a facility, there will
be a disproportionate increase in roads and intersections within the provided
distance. Akin to noise capitalization effects, traffic congestion problems will
fall off at a non-linear rate as one moves further away from a facility. Similarly,
provided that an individual’s utility will increase as congestion becomes less of
a problem, then the highest negative capitalization effects from traffic should
be in the immediate vicinity of an emergency station followed by a non-linear
drop off.
While this explains the non-linear negative effects of noise and traffic, the
non-linearity of response times should be discussed as well. Consider the marginal
effects of an increase in response time given a change in distance from a station.
The expectation is that response time should increase for any given change in
distance r. Therefore, the change in response time (R) will have a positive
15It should be mentioned that for fire stations this assumption will tend to hold, but for
ambulances and police cars the probability of being dispatched directly from the station will
be less than 1. However, in an emergency call, the most likely final destination for the police
or medical services is in fact to return to the station.
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Once an emergency vehicle is traveling at its maximum safe speed, there is
no possibility to accelerate further. As such, at further distances, the marginal
response time cannot be reduced by increasing vehicle speeds. Thus, the second
order derivative of response time should approach zero (i.e. the increase in
response time of traveling an extra meter at a distance of 10,000 meters should
be very close to the change in response time at a distance of 20,000 meters.):
∂2R
∂r2
≈ 0, for r  0
This indicates that it would be highly unlikely for both the positive (rela-
tively less non-linear) and negative (relatively more non-linear) capitalization
effects to perfectly balance. Since these effects are not expected to balance out,
it is only necessary to establish a prediction of which effects will dominate at
any points to develop a testable hypothesis. It is expected that at small values
of r, the negative effects of noise and traffic will dominate the positive effects of
response time due largely in part to the concentration of disamenity effects in
the vicinity of the facilities in question. As r increases, the disamenity effects
will diminish toward 0. Once the disamenity effects reach zero, the associated
impact on utility will also reach zero. Any subsequential increases in r will only
have an impact on the utility levels associated with service provision levels.
These two combined effects will generate a sort of ‘hill’ in housing prices with
the foot of the hill affiliated with housing adjacent to the service station.
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1.4 Methodology
The model used here follows from the rich literature on hedonic regression anal-
ysis. While the data on sales is extremely large, due to the fairly low turnover
rate, the number of observations for any single parcel remains relatively limited.
Often a parcel is only seen as having one sale, with some parcels seeing two or
three sales over the full 18 year panel. As such, this analysis will use all the sales
in a single pooled OLS regression, using time dummies to control for market
price fluctuations unrelated to the variables of interest. The model is as follows:
(1) log(Pricei,t ) = Di + Si +Hi +DHi + Ui + Vt + εi
Where Pricei,t is the sales price house i at time t, and Di is the vector of
distance measurements of interest. Hi includes housing specific characteristics
such as living space, age, and lot size16 Si represents service station characteris-
tics. Variables in the DHi term include the measures of distance for the nearest
elementary schools, distances to the CBD (including CBD square and cubed
distances) indicators for extreme proximity to service stations, and the set of
coastal distance dummies. Ui includes a set of geographical dummy variables,
and Vt is a vector of time dummy variables.
An important note should be made regarding Si. As expected, every fire
station, police station or hospital has its own individual capabilities and train-
ing, resulting in station specific performance characteristics. The quality of
service that an individual may receive can be thought of as being split into two
components; station provision and response time. Independent of the location
16Prior literature has established the usage of housing characteristics while also including
their squared components. As such, this paper will include the squared values of housing-
specific control variables.
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(i.e. controlling for response time), all households should receive the same ap-
proximate station-level of service.17 However, the overall quality of service is
dependent upon response time. Since an individual will receive the same level of
service once the emergency vehicle or service arrives, any differences in service
quality inside a station’s zone can be attributed to the difference in response
time. One advantage of the methodology utilized here is that it aggregates un-
observable station characteristics into a set of station specific dummy variables.
Each station has a dummy variable indicating its subtype (i.e. volunteer fire
station vs. a professional fire station) as well as a station specific dummy vari-
able for each station. The second dummy variable should control for aspects of
station quality that are independent of response time.
The vector of interest, Di, contains variables indicating distance to the near-
est fire station, police station, and hospital. The distance measures come from
two different methods. Euclidean distance is the straight-line distance from one
point to another. This is measured by calculating the distance from the near-
est point of each parcel’s polygon to the location given by the public service
database. To account for expected non-linearities, squared and cubed distances
are also included. The square must be included since the underlying economic
theory dictates the estimation of a model that allows for an inflection. Given
that at closer distances, the economic tension expected to occur may cause a
different curvature effect from locations further away (which should only be in-
fluence by response time effects given that traffic and noise congestion issues
should be trivial in nature), the cubic distance term is also included. This al-
17While there may be differences between two fire stations (e.g. one may have a workers
with more training or better equipment), there should be little difference in service within a
single fire station’s zone. Regardless of whether a location is in the immediate vicinity of a
station or at its extreme response range, upon arriving at the scene, each location will still
receive the same crew with the same equipment.
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lows the model to reveal non-symmetric effects over the distance measure if one
exists in the underlying data generating process.
The second measurement approach is known as a network analysis. Using
this method, it is possible to find the road-based travel distance between parcels.
It is useful to consider this alternative methodology as it provides a more ac-
curate description of the service connection between each parcel and its nearest
service station. The coefficients on this set of variables can be used to estimate
of the non-linear spatial effect of service capitalization, similar to the standard
Euclidean distance measures.
To account for other important but unobserved price determinants associ-
ated with public services, two geographical dummy variables are used; county
specific and city specific variables18. Time variable dummies include yearly (for
yearly housing trends as one would expect given the recent housing bubble) and
monthly measurements. Monthly measures are important to include given the
well known seasonality components of both construction and home sales (i.e.
both construction and sales tend to increase in warmer months, and fall in cooler
months). Additionally, a variable for the interaction of county dummies with
yearly dummies is included to account for county-specific unobserved effects on
a yearly basis.
When considering effects of the different subtypes of stations, a variation
of the main model is used. To allow each subtype of station to have its own
individual effect, a series of interaction variables is included as follows:
(2) log(Pricei,t ) = Di + Ti + (Di ∗ Ti) +Hi +DHi + Ui + Vt + εi
18There will be 59 dummies for each county in the sample, and 364 for each city limit
provided by the UFGC.
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Where the addition of Di*Ti represents the interaction term between station
type (Ti) and the individual subtype distance characteristics (Di). This variable
will allow the the estimated slope effects to differ across each station type.
Due potential differences across environments, MSA specific versions of mod-
els (1) and (2) will also be investigated. This may be an important consideration
given that tenants in urban areas may have difference preferences for services
than those in more rural areas. To account for this possibility, a version of the
models will be split into two subsamples based on whether the parcel can be
found in municipal jurisdiction.
There may be an issue of endogeneity regarding station location decisions.
One would expect that a local government’s choice of where to locate the pub-
lic services under consideration is not random.19 The direction of this effect
though is not known a priori. On the one hand, local governments may try
to locate service stations near transportation hubs and densely developed lo-
cations. These effects might tend to bias nearby housing values upward. If
present, such effects would result in a dampening effect on the present analyses,
suggesting the likelihood for lower-bound estimates in the regressions. How-
ever, local governments may also be interested in reducing construction costs
by building in areas containing cheaper land, thus reducing construction costs.
As such, nearby housing values could be biased downward. This endogeneity
problem should affect only the initial choice of station location.
As both a robustness check and as an effort to address this possible en-
dogeneity problem, a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis is also conducted.
19It should also be noted that there may be a political capital story involved as well.
Higher valued homes may have the political will and capability to ‘push’ station construction
to a more preferred distance. Note however, that this assumes that households display their
preferences for station distance through the expenditure of political capital. This would tend
to corroborate the proposed non-linear effects, otherwise households would not spend their
time and/or money lobbying for alternative construction sites.
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This method uses only data on newly constructed facilities to analyze how home
prices change when new stations are constructed.20 The DID analysis compares
the price of two groups of homes; a control group of homes that maintain their
distance from the nearest station throughout the sample period, and a treat-
ment group that initially experiences the same distance as the control group,
but have their distance reduced through the construction of a closer facility.21
This method provides additional insight as to the likely pathway of housing
capitalization effects. Significant results here would indicate that other signifi-
cant findings are not likely from a spurious effect relating to municipal location
choices. The DID model to be used is as follows:
(3) log(Pricei,t ) = Treatmenti + Statei + (Treatmenti ∗ Statei) +Oi + εi
Where Treatment is a dummy variable indicating whether the parcel was
treated (i.e. a station was built more closely that ‘moved’ the parcel from a
further distance to a closer location), while State indicates whether the observed
sale occurred before or after the treatment. The variable of interest will be the
coefficient for (Treatmenti*Statei). A significant value here would demonstrate
that the construction of a new facility altered local housing values; something
that should not occur if the capitalization results in (1) and (2) are a spurious
consequence of urban landform rather than the hypothesized station effects. Oi
contains a vector of the same control variables included in models (1) and (2).
Given the tendency for human error in originally generating the tax rolls,
several filters were applied to the data to remove likely errata. Obvious errors
included homes that were sold in non-existent months, single family homes with
20There were 176 EMS, 145 police, and 464 fire stations built between 1995 and 2010.
21See Figure 1.4 for an illustration of these two groups.
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Figure 1.4: Illustration of control and treatment for DID regression groups.
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living spaces less than 100 or greater than 50,000 square feet, lot sizes less than
100 square meters, and sales prices less than $1,000 or great than $15,000,000.
Two sets of outliers were also removed as the underlying data generating pro-
cess for them might be different than the bulk of the sample. Any homes built
prior to 1900 were removed as well as homes in the 99th and 100th percentile of
distance from the nearest CBD. These filters ultimately removed less than 6%
of qualified home sales.
1.5 Results
Table 3 presents the estimated results for model (1) using both Euclidean and
Network distance measures.22 Both provide evidence in support of the expected
relationship between service provision and home values. While the estimated
magnitudes differ between the three different service categories, they all follow
the same general pattern. As distance from the service station increases, on
average, housing values tend to increase as disamenity effects diminish at a
faster pace than the loss of the amenity of service provision. However, this
effect is non-linear in nature and provided a large enough distance from the
nearest station; housing values begin to level off and eventually decline. This
was expected given the assumption that the utility loss from the disamenity
effects eventually reach zero.
The magnitudes shown in Table 1.3 may at first glance appear to be small
22In general, every model version has high r2 and expected results on the control variables.
Lot size, living area, and coasts are both valuable to homeowners, but lot size and living
area tend to see diminishing returns. Older homes are more likely to be worth less, though
again, there is a diminishing effect of age on home values. These are similar in nature to prior
research.
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Table 1.3: Comparing Euclidean and Network distance results using model (1).
Euclidean Model Network Model
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Hospital Distance 2.29e-6*** 4.82e-7 6.17e-6*** 3.23e-7
Hospital Distance2 -3.78e-10*** 3.32e-11 -2.07e-10*** 1.36e-11
Hospital Distance3 8.99e-15*** 6.42e-16 1.46e-15*** 1.58e-16
Fire Distance 2.4e-5*** 6.63e-7 2.23e-5*** 4.82e-7
Fire Distance2 -3.05e-9*** 1.24e-10 -1.52e-9*** 6.32e-11
Fire Distance3 9.42e-14*** 5.22e-15 2.94e-14*** 1.94e-15
Police Distance 1.53e-5*** 5.49e-7 1.86e-5*** 4.27e-7
Police Distance2 -1.53e-9*** 5.99e-11 -1.07e-9*** 3.73e-11
Police Distance3 2.40e-14*** 1.70e-15 1.79e-14*** 8.61e-16
Total Living Area 5.1e-4*** 4.94e-7 5.06e-4*** 4.99e-7
Total Living Area2 -2.16e-8*** 6.08e-10 -2.14e-8*** 6.14e-11
Lot Size 1.22e-5*** 6.52e-8 1.2e-5*** 6.56e-8
Lot Size2 -6.98e-12*** 6.69e-14 -6.82e-12*** 6.69e-14
Age -0.006*** 3.47e-5 -0.006*** 3.49e-5
Age2 3.49e-5*** 4.56e-7 3.23e-5*** 4.58e-7
Elementary Distance 1.63e-5*** 2.71e-7 1.19e-5*** 2.7e-7
CBD Distance 8.98e-6*** 7.86e-7 1.76e-6** 7.69e-7
CBD Distance2 -4.05e-10*** 3.22e-11 -2.32e-10*** 3.18e-11
CBD Distance3 4.91e-15*** 3.82e-16 3.52e-15*** 3.79e-16
Coast 5m 0.537*** 0.002 0.531*** 0.002
Coast 25m 0.485*** 0.002 0.477*** 0.002
Coast 50m 0.243*** 0.003 0.233*** 0.003
Coast 100m 0.117*** 0.002 0.112*** 0.002
Coast 200m 0.07*** 0.002 0.065*** 0.002
Coast 500m 0.031*** 0.002 0.03*** 0.001
Coast 1000m -0.007*** 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Coast 2000m -0.015*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001
Observations 3309888 3273202
R2 0.821 0.821
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All regressions include county, city, and time dummies.
in magnitude (especially the square and cubic coefficients). However, recall
these effects are per meter variables. Given the average distance from each
station type, most housing units experience a non-trivial effect. Figure 1.5
visually illustrates the implied effects of distance from service stations. Fire
stations demonstrate that, all else equal, a house bordering a fire station will
be approximately 5.7% less valuable than a home located approximately 2.2
miles away (the aforementioned Goldilock’s Zone). Similarly, police stations
tend to generate a 4% differential in house prices while hospitals generate a
much smaller maximum differential at just .38%.23
23The distance measures start at 250 meters due to the use of a dummy variable to control
for homes very close to facilities. When within 250 meters of a fire station, housing prices drop
by another 1.5%, and 2.2% when near police stations. Hospitals however exhibit a positive
proximity valuation of 4%, likely indicating the high value placed on the low response time
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Figure 1.5: Capitalization effects based on Euclidean distance measures.
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This likely indicates that the utility loss from a marginal change in response
time for hospitals is much larger than for other service types. Such an effect
may be expected if consumers value the service a hospital provides more than
police or fire stations. Given that an emergency visit to a hospital is more likely
to be a life-threatening situation compared to a fire or police response. Another
possibility might lie with a differentiation regarding how hospitals provide their
service. For fire and police stations, the emergency service is provided upon
arriving at the home. However, while ambulances provide some level of service
upon arriving at the home, most of a hospital’s service provision occurs after
the ambulance delivers the patient to the hospital - effectively doubling the
response time for hospitals at any specific distance.
Table 1.4 compares the results for both measurement methods for each of
the seven different subtypes of stations. Since each parcel has distance measures
for each subtype, a special note should be made of the methodology utilized for
model (2). For any home, only one distance measure was used for each subtype
(i.e. three total, one each for fire, police, and hospital). All other distances
were set to zero. As an example, take a home with a fire station 1,000 me-
ters away and a volunteer fire department 10,000 meters away. That home’s
distance measure would be 1,000 for staffed fire stations and zero for volunteer
fire departments. This prevents the home’s distance measure to the volunteer
fire department from creating untoward effects on the calculated volunteer co-
efficients. However, this distance measure of zero still has implications in that
a measurement of zero has a specific meaning (i.e. bordering) when consider-
ing distance measures. Thus, an additional dummy variable was constructed
for each subtype designated by a 1 if the distance measure is zero. Including
regardless of disamenities.
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these dummies should help control for distance measures that are included in
the regression, but that shouldn’t be altering any coefficients given that this
analysis is limited to only nearest station results. After controlling for these
effects, the results are found to validate the proposed hypothesis once again.
The coefficients associated with each subtype demonstrate increasing housing
values at near distance measures followed by an inversion at farther distances.
While the magnitudes may differ across each station subtype, they still each
create the expected pattern of curvature as expected.
Given the differences between rural and urban service provision and rela-
tive distances, it is a logical step to split the sample into two groups to test
whether the prior results are generally robust. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 present the
results from taking models (1) and (2) and splitting them up into urban and
rural samples.24 Regardless of urban or rural classification, when considering
the broadest definition of each service type, the results are found to be con-
sistent with expectations. Each type’s coefficients generate the now familiar
‘hill’ shape of housing values. In the case of urban hospitals, the level distance
measurement is found to be statistically insignificant, but the squared term has
become positive and the cubic term has become negative, thus still generating
the expected housing value curvature.
Similarly, as shown in Table 1.6, when using the different subtype distance
measurements, the results generally hold true. For urban locations, hospitals
share a similar result wherein the level measure is not statistically different from
zero, but the squared and cubic terms still have the expected signs. All other
subtypes in urban areas are found to have the predicted signs. However, while in
rural areas a similar case occurs with volunteer fire departments, both the police
24The urban designation what provided to any parcel within one of the 364 cities’ municipal
boundaries. All other parcels were classified as rural.
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Table 1.4: Comparing Euclidean and Network distance results using model (2).
Euclidean Model Network Model
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Hospital Distance 2.42e-6*** 4.84e-7 7.09e-6*** 3.23e-7
Hospital Distance2 -3.77e-10*** 3.33e-11 -2.37e-10*** 1.37e-11
Hospital Distance3 8.89e-15*** 6.45e-16 1.71e-15*** 1.58e-16
Fire Stations 2.49e-5*** 6.85e-7 2.2e-5*** 5.09e-7
Fire Stations2 -3.33e-9*** 1.29e-10 -1.45e-9*** 6.81e-11
Fire Stations3 1.03e-13*** 5.37e-15 2.76e-14*** 2.13e-15
Fire Volunteer 2.5e-5*** 2.76e-6 3.87e-5*** 1.9e-6
Fire Volunteer2 -2.11e-9*** 5.08e-10 -2.92e-9*** 2.28e-10
Fire Volunteer3 1.03e-13** 5.37-15 6.33e-14*** 7.71e-15
Police HQ 3.47e-6*** 1.03e-6 1.1e-5*** 6.9e-7
Police HQ2 -5.65e-10*** 1.22e-10 -6.72e-10*** 5.93e-11
Police HQ3 8.36e-15*** 3.92e-15 1.26e-14*** 1.36e-15
Police Sheriff 2.27e-5*** 8.08e-7 1.9e-5*** 5.53e-7
Police Sheriff2 -2.42e-9*** 9.74e-11 -1.04e-9*** 4.72e-11
Police Sheriff3 5.44e-14*** 3.21e-15 1.75e-14*** 1.09e-15
Police Substation 2.84e-5*** 1.4e-6 1.81e-5*** 1.13e-6
Police Substation2 -2.79e-9*** 1.83e-10 -7.43e-10*** 1.17e-10
Police Substation3 4.34e-14*** 6.27e-15 1.24e-14*** 2.97e-15
Police Other 6.61e-6*** 1.20e-6 1.14-e-5*** 9.48e-7
Police Other2 -7.03e-10*** 1.20e-10 -8.07e-9*** 8.13e-11
Police Other3 3.04e-15*** 1.20e-15 -1.39e-14*** 1.77e-15
Total Living Area 5.1e-4*** 4.94e-7 5.07e-4*** 4.99e-7
Total Living Area2 -2.15e-8*** 6.08e-11 -2.14e-8*** 6.15e-11
Lot Size 1.22e-5*** 6.52e-8 1.2e-5*** 6.56e-8
Lot Size2 -6.98e-12*** 6.69e-14 -6.83e-12*** 6.69e-14
Age -0.006*** 3.47e-5 -0.006*** 3.49e-5
Age2 3.49e-5*** 4.56e-7 3.23e-5*** 4.58e-7
Elementary Distance 1.65e-5*** 2.72e-7 1.21e-5*** 2.69e-7
CBD Distance 8.725e-6*** 7.87e-7 9.46e-7 7.71e-7
CBD Distance2 -3.97e-10*** 3.23e-11 -2e-10*** 3.18e-11
CBD Distance3 4.86e-15*** 3.83e-16 3.25e-15*** 3.81e-16
Coast 5m 0.537*** 0.002 0.531*** 0.002
Coast 25m 0.484*** 0.002 0.478*** 0.002
Coast 50m 0.243*** 0.003 0.234*** 0.003
Coast 100m 0.117*** 0.002 0.113*** 0.002
Coast 200m 0.07*** 0.002 0.066*** 0.002
Coast 500m 0.031*** 0.001 0.03*** 0.001
Coast 1000m -0.008*** 0.001 -0.02 0.001
Coast 2000m -0.016*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001
Observations 3309888 3273202
R2 0.821 0.821
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All regressions include county, city, and time dummies.
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Table 1.5: Urban vs. rural effects using model (1) with Euclidean distance
measures.
Urban Rural
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Hospital Distance -5.02e-7 8.12e-7 2.64e-6*** 6.76e-7
Hospital Distance2 1.76e-10** 7.00e-11 -4.7e-10*** 4.38e-11
Hospital Distance3 -3.27e-15** 1.48e-15 1.09e-14*** 8.04e-16
Fire Distance 2.01e-5*** 1.53e-6 2.43e-5*** 8.86e-7
Fire Distance2 -2.62e-9*** 4.61e-10 -2.83e-9*** 1.57e-10
Fire Distance3 4.73e-14 3.75e-14 8.45e-14*** 6.21e-15
Police Distance 2.47e-5*** 1.15e-6 1.54e-5*** 7.68e-7
Police Distance2 -3.73e-9*** 2.01e-10 -1.47e-9*** 7.64e-11
Police Distance3 1.49e-13*** 9.43e-15 2.14e-14*** 2e-15
Total Living Area 5.27e-4*** 7.66e-7 4.91e-4*** 6.63e-7
Total Living Area2 -2.52e-8*** 1e-10 -1.93e-8*** 7.76e-11
Lot Size 2.25e-5*** 1.77e-7 1.1e-5*** 7.4e-8
Lot Size2 -1.59e-11*** 1.84e-13 -6.10e-12*** 7.5e-14
Age -0.007*** 4.59e-5 -0.003*** 6e-5
Age2 4.89e-5*** 5.38e-7 -4.19e-5*** 1.06e-6
Elementary Distance 1.89e-5*** 5.04e-7 1.39e-5*** 3.45e-7
CBD Distance 1.07e-5*** 1.27e-6 9.86e-6*** 1.12e-6
CBD Distance2 -3.88e-10*** 6.30e-11 -4.45e-10*** 4.29e-11
CBD Distance3 4.31e-15*** 9.04e-16 5.4e-15*** 4.85e-16
Coast 5m 0.531*** 0.003 0.544*** 0.003
Coast 25m 0.472*** 0.003 0.497*** 0.004
Coast 50m 0.2*** 0.003 0.294*** 0.004
Coast 100m 0.119*** 0.002 0.11*** 0.003
Coast 200m 0.086*** 0.002 0.049*** 0.003
Coast 500m 0.041*** 0.002 0.02*** 0.002
Coast 1000m -0.001 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002
Coast 2000m -0.011*** 0.001 -0.019*** 0.002
Observations 15128558 1797033
R2 0.857 0.794
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All regressions include county, city, and time dummies.
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Table 1.6: Urban vs. rural effects using model (2) with Euclidean distance
measures.
Urban Rural
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Hospital Distance -3.75e-8 8.16e-7 2.87e-6*** 6.79e-7
Hospital Distance2 1.40e-10** 7.05e-11 -4.67e-10*** 4.4e-11
Hospital Distance3 -2.9e-15* 1.49e-15 1.07e-14*** 8.08e-16
Fire Stations 2.02e-5*** 1.57e-6 2.54e-5*** 9.18e-7
Fire Stations2 -2.9e-9*** 4.77e-10 -3.16e-9*** 1.63e-10
Fire Stations3 7.83e-14* 3.96e-14 9.4e-14*** 6.4e-15
Fire Volunteer 6.91e-5*** 6.77e-6 3.16e-6 3.45e-6
Fire Volunteer2 -1.12e-8*** 1.81e-9 2.03e-9*** 6.23e-10
Fire Volunteer3 4.35e-13*** 1.34e-13 -1.16e-13*** 3.03e-14
Police HQ 1.36e-5*** 1.92e-6 -2.44e-6 1.97e-6
Police HQ2 -2.40e-9*** 3.92e-10 6.92e-11 1.9e-10
Police HQ3 7.78e-14*** 2.21e-14 -1.03e-14** 5.22e-15
Police Sheriff 2.35e-5*** 1.99e-6 2.25e-5*** 1.01e-6
Police Sheriff2 -2.55e-9*** 3.2e-10 -2.41e-9*** 1.16e-10
Police Sheriff3 8.6e-14*** 1.39e-14 5.4e-14*** 3.66e-15
Police Substation 5.7e-5*** 2.43e-6 2.93e-5*** 2.44e-6
Police Substation2 -1.01e-8*** 4.59e-9 -2.15e-9*** 2.76e-10
Police Substation3 4.54e-13*** 2.35e-14 1.61e-14*** 8.6e-15
Police Other 1.68e-5*** 2.75e-6 1.77e-6 1.74e-6
Police Other2 -1.93e-9*** 4.84e-10 -6.16e-10** 1.57e-10
Police Other3 9.54e-14*** 2.15e-14 3.44e-14 3.44e-15
Total Living Area 5.26e-4*** 7.66e-7 4.91e-4*** 6.63e-7
Total Living Area2 -2.52e-8*** 1.e-10 -1.93e-8*** 7.76e-11
Lot Size 2.25e-5*** 1.77e-7 1.1e-5*** 7.4e-8
Lot Size2 -1.59e-11*** 1.84e-13 -6.1e-12*** 7.5e-14
Age -0.007*** 4.59e-5 -0.003*** 6e-5
Age2 4.89e-5*** 5.39e-7 -4.2e-5*** 1.06e-6
Elementary Distance 1.91e-5*** 5.09e-7 1.42e-5*** 3.46e-7
CBD Distance 1.01e-5*** 1.27e-6 9.01e-6 1.12e-6
CBD Distance2 -3.74e-10*** 6.33e-11 -4.08e-10*** 4.3e-11
CBD Distance3 4.31e-15*** 9.07e-16 4.98e-15*** 4.86e-16
Coast 5m 0.531*** 0.003 0.543*** 0.003
Coast 25m 0.472*** 0.003 0.496*** 0.004
Coast 50m 0.2*** 0.003 0.294*** 0.004
Coast 100m 0.119*** 0.002 0.109*** 0.003
Coast 200m 0.085*** 0.002 0.048*** 0.003
Coast 500m 0.04*** 0.002 0.019*** 0.002
Coast 1000m -0.002 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002
Coast 2000m -0.012*** 0.001 -0.02*** 0.002
Observations 1512855 1797033
R2 0.857 0.794
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All regressions include county, city, and time dummies.
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headquarters and police other categories only have statistical significance on one
variable (the cubic and square term respectively). These results run counter to
the hypothesis. Despite this, there may be an explanation. Relatively few police
headquarters and other police structures in rural areas combined with larger
average distance measures and sparse sales may lead to the reported statistical
insignificance. There may also be concerns over the choice of defining urban and
rural areas as strictly a jurisdictional divide. As evidenced by Jacksonville, the
city’s jurisdictional limits include nearly the entire county’s land area, resulting
in a number of parcels that observers may think of as rural being included in the
urban designation. In either case, it must be cautioned, that these results likely
hold in urban areas, but there may be more hesitation about the generality of
these results as they might pertain to rural areas.
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 perform the same analyses utilizing Network distance
measures instead of the standard Euclidean calculations. As before, both ur-
ban and rural areas demonstrate the expected signs and similar magnitudes as
prior results have shown. While there is statistical insignificance for general fire
stations at the cubic level in urban areas, the level and squared terms still cre-
ate the predicted curvatures. When estimating these coefficients using station
subtypes, both rural and urban areas are found to follow the principles laid out
previously. Urban fire stations continue to demonstrate no asymmetric effects
through the cubic coefficient, and the urban sheriff’s offices also lose statistical
significance on the cubic term. Each subtype those still has a positive level and
negative squared term as expected.
The only unexpected result in rural areas stems from the positive squared
term on police substations. These are also relatively sparsely found rural areas,
however, the coefficient on the cubic term is negative, indicating that the results
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Table 1.7: Urban vs. rural effects using model (1) with Network distance mea-
sures.
Urban Rural
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Hospital Distance 8.75e-6*** 7.01e-7 4.03e-6*** 4.66e-7
Hospital Distance2 -3.82e-10*** 4.73e-11 -1.63e-10*** 1.83e-11
Hospital Distance3 6.14e-15** 8.8e-16 1.07e-15*** 1.92e-16
Fire Distance 1.46e-5*** 1.1e-6 2.61e-5*** 6.54e-7
Fire Distance2 -1e-9*** 2.23e-10 -1.58e-9*** 8.17e-11
Fire Distance3 -2.16e-15 1.24e-14 2.71e-14*** 2.4e-15
Police Distance 2.21e-5*** 8.95e-7 2.08e-5*** 6e-7
Police Distance2 -2.03e-9*** 1.24e-10 -1.13e-9*** 4.78e-11
Police Distance3 6.42e-14*** 4.81e-15 1.88e-14*** 1.03e-15
Total Living Area 5.23e-4*** 7.73e-7 4.85e-4*** 6.68e-7
Total Living Area2 -2.5e-8*** 1.01e-10 -1.9e-8*** 7.82e-11
Lot Size 2.36e-5*** 1.82e-7 1.08e-5*** 7.42e-8
Lot Size2 -1.63e-11*** 1.86e-13 -5.92e-12*** 7.48e-14
Age -0.007*** 4.63e-5 -0.003*** 6.02e-5
Age2 4.77e-5*** 5.42e-7 -4.69e-5*** 1.06e-6
Elementary Distance 1.71e-5*** 4.97e-7 9.17e-6*** 3.42e-7
CBD Distance -2.11e-6* 1.20e-6 8.8e-6*** 1.12e-6
CBD Distance2 2.03e-10*** 6.04e-11 -5.75e-10*** 4.31e-11
CBD Distance3 -2.24e-15** 8.74e-16 7.3e-15*** 4.89e-16
Coast 5m 0.523*** 0.003 0.541*** 0.003
Coast 25m 0.465*** 0.003 0.49*** 0.003
Coast 50m 0.193*** 0.003 0.278*** 0.004
Coast 100m 0.114*** 0.002 0.108*** 0.003
Coast 200m 0.079*** 0.002 0.044*** 0.003
Coast 500m 0.036*** 0.002 0.023*** 0.002
Coast 1000m -2.26e-5 0.002 -0.002 0.002
Coast 2000m -0.009*** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.002
Observations 1502792 1770410
R2 0.857 0.795
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All regressions include county, city, and time dummies.
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still expect a ‘hill’ shape with a steeper near slope than predicted. Given that
police substations are generally highly active locations, consumer’s utility may
be more heavily penalized by locating near such stations. In such a case, it
might be plausible for movements away from the station to generate larger
utility gains than expected, especially if local consumers feel that there is little
to gain from police services (i.e. rural locations might be correlated with lower
levels of crime (Wells and Weisheit, 2004), thus diminishing the expected need
for police).
Another possibility may be an externality-based story. For any fire truck
or ambulance driving past a home, the act of driving past confers no direct
benefit on the tenants. An ambulance traveling past a home does not alter
the likelihood of a medical emergency in the future. Similarly, traffic from fire
trucks will not change the probability of a house fire. However, Bahn (1974)
and Sherman and Weisburd (1995) both provide evidence that increased police
presence may have a dampening effect on local crime rates. If the mere presence
of police traffic can have effect crime rates, then this may result in amenity and
disamenity effects generating similar, but opposite effects. The outcome of this
possibility is that it may become difficult to differentiate which economic effect
is dominating, thus creating the aforementioned insignificant results.
As discussed in the prior section, the possibility exists that housing values
may be a function of the underlying urban landform. If this were the case, then
it could be that municipal choice of station locations may be driving the results,
rather than the hypothesized service effects. A difference-in-difference analysis
can be used to address this concern. If the underlying urban landform were
generating these results, then the construction of a new station should have no
impact on the value of homes in its service area. However, if the previous results
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Table 1.8: Urban vs. rural effects using model (2) with Network distance mea-
sures.
Urban Rural
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Hospital Distance 1e-5*** 7.03e-7 5.02e-6*** 4.67e-7
Hospital Distance2 -4.46e-10*** 4.75e-11 -1.97e-10*** 1.84e-11
Hospital Distance3 7.08e-15*** 8.83e-16 1.34e-15*** 1.93e-16
Fire Stations 1.47e-5*** 1.14e-6 2.6e-5*** 6.94e-7
Fire Stations2 -9.7e-10*** 2.35e-10 -1.58e-9*** 8.78e-11
Fire Stations3 8.01e-15 1.33e-14 2.79e-14*** 2.62e-15
Fire Volunteer 3.88e-5*** 5.23e-6 3.73e-5*** 2.35e-6
Fire Volunteer2 -4.46e-9*** 8.74e-10 -2.2e-9*** 2.75e-10
Fire Volunteer3 1.51e-13*** 4.27e-14 4.12e-14*** 8.64e-15
Police HQ 1.61e-5*** 1.41e-6 9.94e-6*** 1.22e-6
Police HQ2 -1.36e-9*** 2.15e-10 -5.83e-10*** 8.82e-11
Police HQ3 1.97e-14** 9.19e-15 1.19e-14*** 1.79e-15
Police Sheriff 1.25e-5*** 1.57e-6 2.19e-5*** 7.15e-7
Police Sheriff2 -5.78e-10** 2.24e-10 -1.15e-9*** 5.76e-11
Police Sheriff3 3.69e-15 9.03e-15 1.94e-14*** 1.28e-15
Police Substation 2.89e-5*** 1.69e-6 9.18e-6*** 1.96e-6
Police Substation2 -2.63e-9*** 2.23e-10 6.75e-10*** 1.82e-10
Police Substation3 8.5e-14*** 8.24e-15 -2.09e-14*** 4.17e-15
Police Other 2.25e-5*** 2.31e-6 9.43e-6*** 1.35e-6
Police Other2 -2.93e-9*** 3.33e-10 -7.44e-10*** 1.04e-10
Police Other3 1.39e-13*** 1.32e-14 1.36e-14*** 2.14e-15
Total Living Area 5.24e-4*** 7.73e-7 4.85e-4*** 6.68e-7
Total Living Area2 -2.5e-8*** 1.01e-10 -1.9e-8*** 7.82e-11
Lot Size 2.36e-5*** 1.82e-7 1.08e-5*** 7.42e-8
Lot Size2 -1.63e-11*** 1.86e-13 -5.94e-12*** 7.48e-14
Age -0.007*** 4.63e-5 -0.003*** 6.03e-5
Age2 4.77e-5*** 5.42e-7 -4.69e-5*** 1.06e-6
Elementary Distance 1.81e-5*** 5.01e-7 9.3e-6*** 3.42e-7
CBD Distance -2.97e-6** 1.21e-6 7.31e-6*** 1.12e-6
CBD Distance2 2.42e-10*** 6.09e-11 -5.13e-10*** 4.33e-11
CBD Distance3 -2.62e-15*** 8.79e-16 6.72e-15*** 4.91e-16
Coast 5m 0.524*** 0.003 0.5432*** 0.003
Coast 25m 0.466*** 0.003 0.49*** 0.003
Coast 50m 0.193*** 0.003 0.279*** 0.004
Coast 100m 0.114*** 0.002 0.109*** 0.003
Coast 200m 0.08*** 0.002 0.045*** 0.003
Coast 500m 0.037*** 0.002 0.023*** 0.002
Coast 1000m -3.79e-4 0.002 -0.002 0.002
Coast 2000m -0.009*** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.002
Observations 1502792 1770410
R2 0.857 0.795
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All regressions include county, city, and time dummies.
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were the consequence of amenity and disamenity effects as predicted, then the
construction of a new service station should cause housing values to change
within the new station’s service area.25 To test for either of these possibilities, a
comparison can be made between parcels that do not change their distance from
the nearest station, and those whose distance is shortened by the construction
of a new facility.
For the DID analysis, a band width and a band location must be chosen. The
band locations can be generated from the prior estimation results. Specifically,
the Goldilock’s Zone was chosen as the starting point. As such, any parcels
that already sit in the Goldilock’s Zone will be compared to those that start in
the same area, but have their distance to the nearest station reduced through
new construction. The final destination band was calculated as the distance at
which the station-specific effects on housing values had dropped by 50%.26 An
area of 500 meters was chosen (250 meters on each side of the band) around each
band location to collect enough observations to run the DID without reducing
the control variable count. However, this did result in low observation counts
when using the Network model coefficients to calculate the band locations. To
remedy this the band area was increase to a 1000 meter thickness (500 meters
on each side of the chosen location band) for comparison purposes.
For a treatment analysis to be valid, both the treated and untreated groups
should, on average, be statistically similar (or balanced) across each observable
variable. The variable comparisons for fire stations can be found in Tables 1.10,
1.11, and 1.12. It should be noted however, that outside of the three variables in
25More specifically, if the underlying parcel is within the Goldilock’s Zone or closer to the
original station, then the construction of a newer, closer facility should on average reduce the
house’s value. If the parcel is further away, then a newly constructed facility would likely
increase the home’s price so long as the home doesn’t ‘jump’ from the distance side of the
Goldilock’s Zone to the near side.
26See Table 1.9 for an overview of these distances.
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Table 1.9: Band location choices for difference-in-difference models: Distance
in meters
Goldilock’s Zone (Miles) 50 Percent Band (Miles)
Euclidean Fire 5175 (3.216) 1400 (0.87)
Network Fire 10600 (6.587) 2725 (1.693)
Euclidean Hospitals 3450 (2.144) 950 (0.59)
Network Hospitals 18525 (11.511) 5100 (3.169)
Euclidean Police 5800 (3.604) 1600 (0.944)
Network Police 12800 (7.954) 3275 (2.035)
the hospital DID, there are not statistically similar variables. At this point, the
standard procedure would be to introduce a matching methodology to select a
subset of the treatment analysis whose variables meet the balance requirements.
Exact matching cannot be used due to a lack of perfectly similar treatment
and control observations. Iacus, King and Giuseppe (2011a) provides a new
methodology known as coarsened exact matching (CEM) to address this issue.27.
Both non-matched and matched versions of the DID have been provided.
Table 1.10: Variable comparisons for Euclidean and Network fire models.
500m Euclidean 1000m Network
Treated Untreated Treated Untreated
Standard Standard Standard Standard
Variable Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error
log(Sale Price) 12.14 0.63 11.93 0.70 12.29 0.67 11.98 0.73
Living Area 2302.11 927.41 2252.87 823.18 2452.38 996.97 2296.01 859.40
Lot Size 1082.29 1903.54 2816.24 9870.28 1330.98 3491.29 5043.28 16302.60
Age 10.858 14.30 9.73 11.04 12.96 23.45 9.49 11.78
CBD Distance 17964.79 9387.53 25268.49 12411.51 20832.56 11492.77 29067.45 11967.31
Elementary Distance 1793.86 1427.01 2780.03 2609.89 2163.33 1764.62 3837.29 3337.21
In City 0.44 0.50 0.18 0.38 0.44 0.500 0.14 0.34
Observations 47099 53745 26562 11960
* Denotes statistically indistinguishable means.
Table 1.13 presents the results of the difference-in-difference analysis for fire
stations. The variable of interest, Difference, is both negative and statisti-
cally significant for both methods of distance measurement. This indicates that
homes which were serviced by a newly constructed facility closer than their orig-
27See Iacus, King and Giuseppe (2011b) for a discussion of the statistical properties of
CEM. CEM benefits from the ability to address any leftover imbalance issues by including
control variables in the structural regression equation. Unfortunately, the CEM methodol-
ogy is relatively data hungry making it difficult to assess the validity of smaller sample size
questions. As such, the CEM methodology has only been used on the more observationally
expansive Euclidean versions of the DID.
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Table 1.11: Variable comparisons for Euclidean and Network hospital models.
500m Euclidean 1000m Network
Treated Untreated Treated Untreated
Standard Standard Standard Standard
Variable Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error
log(Sale Price) 12.37 0.88 11.84 0.75 12.09 0.68 11.87 0.80
Living Area 2008.46 1158.82 1934.88 945.62 2267.47* 892.47 2262.97* 1016.50
Lot Size 664.80 1232.74 1038.08 1720.14 1033.26 1355.04 2440.36 6065.77
Age 25.92* 20.52 26.72* 18.62 19.92 29.78 13.08 12.82
CBD Distance 14491.01 3616.08 17160.59 12441.32 23504.40 11486.47 24520.23 11717.39
Elementary Distance 972.89* 460.10 971.34* 700.19 1709.80 947.767 2912.51 2654.91
In City 0.90 0.30 0.62 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.24 0.43
Observations 3609 269506 8988 44763
* Denotes statistically indistinguishable means.
Table 1.12: Variable comparisons for Euclidean and Network police models.
500m Euclidean 1000m Network
Treated Untreated Treated Untreated
Standard Standard Standard Standard
Variable Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error
log(Sale Price) 12.12 0.71 11.96 0.68 11.99 0.88 12.13 0.72
Living Area 2181.38 987.55 2275.75 859.28 2173.80 998.65 2390.965 918.33
Lot Size 1116.33 1522.93 1429.08 4598.08 1368.97 1916.78 2226.45 12655.80
Age 15.11 17.09 11.82 13.03 10.22 11.194 8.22 9.50
CBD Distance 17393.08 8573.93 22510.05 11714.70 22477.16 11580.18 27815.46 13472.40
Elementary Distance 1402.28 925.55 1801.92 1635.11 1340.19 1057.15 3268.50 2803.44
In City 0.59 0.49 0.25 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.12 0.33
Observations 16264 174529 11334 54115
* Denotes statistically indistinguishable means.
inal fire station found their housing values to fall.28 In this situation, it would
be expected that housing values should decrease since any movement toward a
station from the Goldilock’s Zone will be generating greater traffic and noise
disamenities while providing less utiliity from increased service provision. If
the distance coefficients were merely the result of urban landforms, then the
difference-in-difference should not be picking up a change in housing values.
Importantly, the use of the CEM methodology corroborates these findings.
28Recall that included in the DID analysis are variables controlling for station type and
quality. This is important, as failure to do so could mean that the measured effects were
derived from a change in station-specific capability rather than distance variability.




Variable Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error
Difference -0.032*** 0.012 -0.109*** 0.037 -0.031** 0.013
Treatment 0.039 0.025 0.123* 0.068 0.059* 0.03
State 0.003 0.009 0.018 0.034 0.017 0.011
Observations 100844 38522 83998
R2 0.782 0.829 0.805
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All control variables used in the full sample regressions are included here.
39




Variable Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error
Difference -0.059** 0.027 -0.14*** 0.051 -0.042* 0.021
Treatment 0.057 0.236 -0.806*** 0.182 -0.011 0.207
State -0.015* 0.008 0.016 0.022 -0.025* 0.014
Observations 273115 53751 117213
R2 0.878 0.82 0.92
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All control variables used in the full sample regressions are included here.
For hospitals, Table 1.14 provides evidence of the expected result; negative
and statistically significant effects. The construction of new hospitals has, on
average, resulted in a decrease in house prices for those parcels serviced by
the new stations. Using CEM continues to provide similar results as the DID
analysis.
The difference-in-difference results for police stations are in Table 1.15. Un-
fortunately, newly constructed police stations are found to have a negative but
statistically insignificant effect on housing values. This indicates that nonran-
dom station location choices may be at least partially driving the police station
results found in Tables 1.5 through 1.9. Indeed, this finding may indicate why
the police station results for rural areas in Table 1.7 do not completely con-
form to the predicted hypothesis. While this does not necessarily negate the
prior findings, it does mean that there might an opening for future research
to address this issue. After accounting for imbalance, the CEM method finds
statistically significant results of the sign expected when considering Euclidean
distance measures.
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Variable Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error
Difference -0.001 0.013 -0.024 0.029 -0.025* 0.013
Treatment -0.241*** 0.053 -0.272 0.256 -0.429*** 0.058
State -0.005 0.006 0.027 0.02 0.002 0.01
Observations 190793 65449 93610
R2 0.792 0.8 0.874
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
† All control variables used in the full sample regressions are included here.
1.6 Conclusion
While previous research into the capitalization effects of emergency public ser-
vices has been elusive, this paper represents a step forward in uncovering the
effect of station distance on local housing values. The work here may be use-
ful to scholars as well as urban planners and local developers when considering
new service station and housing development locations. Of particular interest
may be the overall effects that station placement can have on the local property
tax base. While any single individual home’s price may not see intensive price
changes; given the large numbers of homes that even a single facility will service,
this can amount to a rather large total economic effect.
These regressions indicate that fire stations and hospitals by and large fol-
low the hypothesized non-linear effects which will create “Goldilock’s Zones”.
These results are supported by the difference-in-difference analyses, which pro-
vide evidence that home prices change with the construction of new facilities
as opposed to being a spurious result of underlying urban landforms. While
considerable evidence suggests that police stations also follow the predicted hy-
pothesis, the difference-in-difference analysis on police stations cannot rule out
the possibility of spurious results.
Additionally, by utilizing the majority of the state of Florida, the results
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herein should be generalizable to other locations. This is also supported by
results indicating relative robustness to urban versus rural locations. Impor-
tantly, the results provided uphold the establishment of the hypothesized loca-
tion based amenity-disamenity relationship. While additional research may be
needed to establish the magnitudes of these relationships in other counties or
states, it should be possible to identify other “Goldilock’s Zones” elsewhere.
The methodology here can also be generalized to investigate other locations
than may generate both positive and negative economic effects such as airports,
industrial plants, sports stadiums, etcetera.
For scholars and governments interested in better understanding the capital-
ization effects of local public services, this study indicates that service location
has a meaningful effect on nearby housing values. Even homes two or three
miles away from service stations have valuations that still react to the prox-
imity of service locations. Future work on housing capitalization effects should
consider these nuanced location effects. This may be particularly important
when considering the extensive coverage of all three types of services. It may be
interesting to explore other definitions of urban and rural areas, as well as com-
paring the non-linear effects across different urban boundaries. There may also
be valuable future studies utilizing a third measure of service provision; true re-
sponse times. These measures are slowly becoming more reliable as technology





Past research in the capitalization literature has focused on the effect of services
on housing values. The majority of this work has concentrated on single-family
detached housing. While there are many more single family houses than com-
mercial properties across the United States, commercial construction is worth
much more relative to its proportionate size.1 For example, in Florida, nearly
twenty times as many residential (141,014) structures were sold as compared
to non-residential (7,183) structures. However, the residential land in total was
only worth three times as much as the non-residential land. As such, a valu-
able contribution to the literature would be to similarly consider the effects of
public service access on non-residential property values. Specifically, this paper
will focus on fire, police, and emergency medical facilities and their effects on
commercial and industrial property sales prices. In particular, the analysis will
focus on how service facilities may differentially impact property values based on
the designated use of the non-residential building. In addition, the analysis will
include distance measures rarely used in the literature before; road-based mea-
sures (also known as a network analysis) to accompany than the more standard
straight-line, Euclidean distance. The use of road-based measures allows for
1See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012.
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the analysis to more accurately control for the distance that emergency vehicles
must cover to arrive at their destination.
The level of service that a parcel may receive can be broken down into two
major components, in situ service and response time. In situ service is the level
of service that a facility can directly provide to a location. This would include
quality measures such as training and equipment. Interestingly, this measure
of service would be expected to be constant over each station’s service area. In
essence, regardless of how far away a fire station is, once it arrives on location,
it can provide the same level of service to a home one mile away or one ten
miles away. However, response time is also an important determinant of service
provision. Longer response times tend to correlate with degraded outcomes in
emergency situations2. Similarly, the expected loss from a fire would tend to
increase if the fire can burn for longer periods of time before a fire crew can
arrive on site. This is why many insurance companies include distance from
the nearest fire station in generating their cost structures for fire insurance
(Brueckner, 1981). Thus, the three types of public goods analyzed here provide
services that can be defined as a function of the response distance.
However, while these services provide valuable amenities, they also generate
disamenity effects as well. Emergency vehicles en route to a dispatch call will
tend to create traffic congestion on the roads they drive through as well as
producing noise pollution from active sirens. As these effects are undesirable
to many businesses, locations more likely to suffer from such negative effects
should find their property values falling relative to locations that receive lower
probabilities of these disamenity effects. These negative effects may vary from
business to business, not just based on distance from the service facility, but also
2See Blackwell and Kaufman (2002) and Pons et al. (2005)
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upon the type of business at the location. Some commercial structures such as
golf courses may have intense preferences for lower noise pollution compared to
industrial manufacturing plants where additional noise may be less of a concern.
In such a case, it may be expected that non-residential structures preferring
less noise pollution will be more adversely affected by emergency vehicle traffic,
resulting in negative capitalization effects of a larger magnitude than those
businesses with less intensive preferences. Similarly, some business that utilize
more dangerous materials may prefer faster response times from emergency
vehicles.
The following analysis provides two contributions to the literature on non-
residential capitalization effects. Access to fire stations, police stations, and
hospitals are found to correlate with commercial and industrial land prices.
Given the value of each parcel of land, these effects are non-trivial in nature. In
addition, strong heterogeneous effects are found, not just between commercial
and industrial property land use designations, but also between the three dif-
ferent emergency services. For example, camping ground and race tracks tend
to show relatively weak preferences (land prices increasing) for being located
further away from fire stations and hospitals, but demonstrate much stronger
preferences for being closer to police stations. On the other hand nightclubs,
bars, and other adult-oriented entertainment venues tend to see their property
values fall the further away they are from fire stations and hospitals, however,
these same land values increase as with distance from police stations.
The paper is organized as follows. Prior research on non-residential spatial
capitalization effects are covered in Section I. Information on the data utilized
can be found in section II. Methodology and results are reported in Section III
and Section IV respectively. Section V concludes.
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2.1 Literature Review
Prior research on capitalization effects with respect to non-residential structures
can be broadly linked into three categories, spacial locations3, transportation
access, and land usage. The literature on non-residential valuations is extensive.
As such, the following is not an exhaustive review of prior research.
Spatial research has largely focused on the importance of location with re-
spect to Central Business Districts (CBDs), or other large employment centers,
and micro-locational effects. Downing (1973) uses data from Milwaukee, Wis-
consin to analyze some of the main determinants to commercial land values.
The data contained sales from over 400 businesses, and considered measures for
distance to CBD, distance to the nearest shopping center, traffic levels on Main
Street, and corner locations. Downing finds that for the city as a whole, nearby
traffic levels were the only statistically significant and positive predictors. How-
ever, in certain sections of the city, distance to CBD and shopping center were
also positively correlated with commercial land value. In an effort to determine
the specific value of CBD distance on non-residential valuations, Sivitanidou
(1996) considers how commercial structures (specifically office space) value ac-
cess to employment centers. The study demonstrates that office-commercial
land is positively correlated with CBD and large employment access. Addition-
ally, the work provides evidence for jurisdiction-specific and crime rate effects.
Importantly, crime rates are found to fall with the addition of more frequent
police car sightings, indicating that business closer to police stations are likely
to see positive externalities associated with increased local patrolcar presence.4
Interestingly, Schmenner (1981) indicates that distance to the CBD matters lit-
3See Guntermann and Thomas (2005).
4See Bahn (1974).
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tle for manufacturing rents. Using survey data from 535 manufacturing firms
to explore the rental gradient of manufacturing plants, the study finds evidence
that industry does not appear to compete for land in or near the CBD, but
instead observe relatively flat rent gradients across cities.5 This highlights the
importance of considering differential effects based on land usage rather than
performing an analysis that lumps all non-residential structures into one cate-
gory.
More recent work on the effects of transportation access can be found in
Cervero and Duncan (2002), Kim and Zhang (2005), and Debrezion, Pels and
Rietveld (2007). In general, most transportation access research has found posi-
tive and significant effects on commercial land values. These range from 12% to
25% outside of CBD areas to as high as 120% in CBD areas. Kim and Zhang’s
work focuses on subway stations in Seoul and their effect on 731 commercial
locations. As noted, their paper found large positive valuation effects for lo-
cating in and near the CBD, but also found that commercial structures were
positively effected by subway access as well. Using a meta-analysis procedure
Debrezion et. al. find positive values associated with commercial structures
based on distance from the nearest railway station as well. Additionally, Ryan
(2005) uses data from San Diego to explore the effects of light rail and highways
on office and industrial firm values. Ryan’s findings complement prior research
demonstrating the importance of transportation access to commercial and office
structures. However, the author also finds that industrial firms receive no rent
premium for locating close to highways or rail stations.
Land use regulation has also been an extensive area of study. As noted
by Hanushek and Quigley (1990), land use regulations targeting non-residential
5See also Kowalski and Paraskevopoulos (1990) and Peiser (1987) for a more in depth
discussion of industrial capitalization effects.
47
structures have been found to correlate with increased land values. This is of-
ten argued to be a result of local zoning rules attempting to limit low income
businesses or pushing for high profitability firms. Given that higher profit firms
are likely to bid land values up (and therefore property values), local munici-
palities face fiscal incentives to actively manage land use regulations. Asabere
and Huffman (1991) use data from Philadelphia to demonstrate that the act of
rezoning a location for industrial use can be associated with a 58% drop in land
value.
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating effects from three
previously ignored types of services; fire, police, and hospital. These stations
provide valuable services to their local communities, but they have seen little
consideration in the literature. In addition, the literature demonstrates the im-
portance of different types of land use on capitalization effects, indicating that
firm preferences are a vital component to consider in any land value analysis.
Thus, this paper not only discusses the value these locations place on service ac-
cess, but also considers how assorted categories of firms may receive differential
effects from service stations.
2.2 Data
To investigate the effects of fire stations, police stations, and hospitals on non-
residential property, an extensive database has been collected across the state
of Florida. The Florida Department of Revenue (FDOR) has provided tax rolls
that contain detailed information on each parcel of land, including building
characteristics such as lot size, building square footage. In addition, the tax
rolls have information on the sales price, time, and land usage classification.
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The database contains all arms-length transactions from 1994 until 2011. Eight
counties were dropped from the analysis due to issues resulting from unique
parcel ID changes during the period.6
The Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) maintains a database
of emergency services, including information on their capabilities as well as their
latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates.7 Hospitals are the least common and
most concentrated in urban areas. Many rural counties have only a single hos-
pital facility to serve their region. The geographic coverage of fire and police
stations is far more extensive. Fire stations especially are widely scattered and
numerous compared to EMS. All three services display agglomeration tendencies
in urban areas, thus indicating the importance of controlling for central business
district effects. By combining the FDOR tax rolls with data from FDEM, it
becomes possible to calcaulate the Euclidean distance from each non-residential
parcel in the state of Florida to nearby emergency service stations. In addition,
the U.S. Census Bureau has made available Geographical Information Systems
(GIS) data that plots the location of all roads in the state as of 2010. The Cen-
sus Bureau data can be used to run the network analysis, providing detailed
road-based distance measures for all commercial and industrial businesses.
Figure 1.1 shows the location of every fire station within the state of Florida.
With almost 2,000 fire stations, large portions of the state, especially populated
areas, are within close proximity of a station. Police station locations can be
found in Figure 1.2. Many of the more rural areas can be seen to be serviced
by just a handful of police structures, oftentimes by small sheriff offices. Urban
areas are still well covered by police stations. As can be seen in Figure 1.3 how-
6These are; Escambia, Highlands, Hillsborough, Holmes, Levy, Liberty, Santa Rosa and
Volusia.
7The FDEM location data covers 1,917 fire stations, 992 police stations, and 483 hospitals.
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ever, the limited number of hospitals means that rural non-residential structures
may find themselves a great distance from the nearest hospital. There are still
relatively strong agglomerations in the larger urban areas along the coasts in
the southern half of the state.
Additional control variables have been provided by the University of Florida
GeoPlace Center (UFGC) and the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) databases. The UFGC provides extraordinarily
detailed information on coastal data. While the literature suggests that indus-
trial land are less likely to be effected by coastal locations, commercial and office
structures may have a preference for coastal locations, particularly hotels and
motels. Measurements for creating dummy variables were used for structures
within 5, 25, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 2000 meters of the coast. As noted
in the literature, distance from the CBD can have a large effect on commercial
values, especially office buildings. Therefore, the LEHD database was used to
find the highest employment centers in each of the Census designated Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSA). Distance from the census tract with the highest
employment density were used to calculate distance from the CBD.8
Given that not all service stations will have the same equipment and train-
ing, dummy variables are utilized to help control for station specific character-
istics. However, this does not address the fact that certain groups of stations
may have differential slope effects as well. Therefore, each distance measure
was calculated not just to the nearest fire station, police station, and hospi-
tal; but also to each of these different types of stations as well. For example,
larger urban fire stations likely have different amenity and disamenity effects on
8Orange County, home of Orlando, used the second highest employment density tract.
Interestingly, Disney World contains the highest employment center in the county, but is not
located in the downtown area.
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Table 2.1: Select summary statistics.
Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Sales Price ($) 1012531 873128 4072400 5000 448000000
Building Area (sq. ft) 1012531 14366 49526 10 5021883
Lot Size (sq. m) 1012531 8646 45620 5.3 7160417
Age (years) 1012531 27.95 17.71 1 108
In City (dummy) 1012531 0.68 0.47 0 1
Distance to CBD (m) 1012531 20810 22371 0 176898
Euclidean Hospital Distance (m) 1012531 6581 9130 4.96 96446
Euclidean Fire Distance (m) 1012531 1788 1637 0.47 24268
Euclidean Police Distance (m) 1012531 3000 4558 0.32 65565
Network Hospital Distance (m) 1012531 6768 6559 4.96 96449
Network Fire Distance (m) 1012531 2348 2065 0.06 30513
Network Police Distance (m) 1012531 3795 5170 0.67 67622
non-residential land value than the less common, typically rural volunteer fire
departments. Similarly, police stations also have several categories, including
police headquarters, substations, and sheriff offices. A fourth police category
(labeled as ‘other’) was used to combine the largely federal stations such as Al-
cohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), Department of Fish & Wildlife (DFW),
and customs agencies with state highway patrol facilities. Using these distance
measures it is possible to investigate how different types of stations can cause
differential capitalization effects on nearby non-residential structures. See Table
2.1 for select summary statistics.
2.3 Methodology
For the analysis performed here, special attention will be paid to the land use
codes each parcel is designated with. These land use codes identify the category
of improved structure that exists on the parcel. These codes can be fairly precise,
not just differentiating between commercial and industrial property, but even to
the point of noting differences between food packing plants and food processing
plants. To capture the specific station effects of interest here, a cross-sectional
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hedonic regression analysis will be utilized. The model is as follows:
(1) log(Pi,t ) = Di + Li + Si +Xi + Ui + Vt + εi
Where P is the sales price of parcel i in year t. The variable of interest
is Di which contains a vector of distance measurements to the service station
type under consideration. This variable includes the level, square, and cubic
distance terms. The vector Li indicates a set of dummy variables for defining
different land use codes. Xi is a set of control variables describing the physical
structure such as lot size, structure size, and age. Si contains a set of station
dummy variables for each station type to account for differential effects based
on each facilities’ in situ service quality. The variables Ui and Vt control for
various geography and time, respectively. Ui contains city, county, and census
tract location controls while Vt controls for sales month and year. However,
firms likely have differential preferences for locating near these services. This
method fails to account for the possibility that each land use type may have
differential slopes for their capitalization effects.
A second method utilizes the land use codes along with a set of interaction
terms to provide a more nuanced view of the effects of distance on non-residential
sales prices. The following model includes the interaction terms of interest:
(2) log(Pi,t ) = Di + Si + Ti +Xi + Li + (Di ∗ Li) + (Di ∗ Zi) + Ui + Vt + εi
Here, the interaction term Di*Li is the variable of interest. It contains co-
efficients that allow for different effects on each land use type. 22 different
land use types for commercial structures will be considered along with another
8 industrial categories. Each category will be independently interacted with
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the distance measures to retrieve specific distance based capitalization effects.
Given that prior research has demonstrated that distance to the CBD is cor-
related with land prices for commercial structures, particularly office buildings,
but generally or weakly correlated with industrial values, a second set of in-
teraction terms are included in Di*Zi. This set interacts the land usage types
with distance to CBD measurements and the coastal location dummies. This al-
lows for differential effects amongst the different land designations. The coastal
measures are included given that one might believe that hotels and motels more
strongly prefer coastal locations than industries.
A third method of analysis includes a consideration of land use code changes.
The tax roll data provided by the Florida DOR has data on every parcel in the
state for every year. While only a portion of all parcels will be sold during any
one time period, information on each parcel is still recorded over time. This
creates the capability to track any sales that may have resulted in the underlying
structure changing from one land use code to another. For example, a parking
lot (land use code 028) may be sold to an entrepreneur interested in building
a restaurant (land use code 021) on that site. If the lot sells in 1997, the tax
rolls will identify the sale price, date, and the old land use code of 028. If the
restaurant construction is approved by the municipality, then the next year, the
land use code will change to 021. While the tax rolls only identify another sale
for that parcel if the restaurant is eventually sold, these land use code changes
can be a way to identify disamenity effects by land use type. In addition, these
land use changes can be tracked both forward, and backward in time to better
understand how land usage types may react to service station locations.
Finally, of particular interest here, is that each of these methods will include
both standard Euclidean measures of distance from the stations, but also a
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network analysis. This addition provides for more accurate measures of response
capability for emergency services. Given that emergency vehicles must use the
road network to respond, straight-line measures of distance may be inaccurate
for representing the ability of these stations to provide a specific level of service.
This is particularly true given that road based distance measures will almost
always be longer than Euclidean measures, indicating that using straight-line
distances will generally under represent (and thus may bias results) response
times.
2.4 Results
Table 2.2 provides a breakdown of land designations and their sales prices.
While there are some designations with relatively thin sales counts such as
open air entertainment (91), others contain a wealth of sales. Single story stores
account for 18 percent of all sales, with non-professional services offices making
up another 14 percent. In general, far more commercially designated land sold
over this period than industrial land. Golf courses are the most valuable plots of
land per sale, followed by tourist attractions, and malls and regional shopping
centers. The least valuable land is occupied by florists and greenhouses.
The results of using model (1) with both Euclidean and Network distance
measures can be found in Table 2.3. Table 2.3 shows the effect of each land
designation category on land values. Given that industrial warehousing and
storage is the omitted variable, most land types are more highly valued than
warehousing land. Three are worth less; mixed office and retail, professional
services, and produce housing. As might be expected, land designated for golf
courses is highly valued, as are hotels, and malls and shopping centers. As
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Table 2.2: Land usage categories and sales prices.
Commercial Number Average Price Price Per ft2
(1) Single Story Stores 184386 512986 117
(2) Mixed Store and Offices 77871 266814 126
(3) Department Store/Supermarkets 11333 1900335 115
(4) Malls and Shopping Centers 26975 3639243 97
(5) Non-Professional Service Offices 147480 1029286 207
(6) Professional Service Buildings 65946 531908 234
(7) Transportation Terminals 2785 1285756 1084
(8) Restaurants 58687 859391 234
(9) Financial and Insurance 20882 1377801 283
(10) Repair, Service, and Auto Sales 103447 553760 172
(11) Parking Lots/Mobile Home Sales 31180 1184791 6384
(12) Outlets and Produce Houses 3465 376663 61
(13) Florists and Greenhouses 1876 138614 75
(14) Open Air Entertainment 91 525774 183
(15) Enclosed Auditoriums/Theaters 969 1996806 137
(16) Nightclubs and Bars 9721 372845 113
(17) Daytime Attractions/Arenas 2483 836509 126
(18) Tourist Attractions 2033 4478406 345
(19) Camps 2475 781720 735
(20) Racing 315 903367 354
(21) Golf Courses 10639 6062071 4984
(22) Hotels or Motels 32428 2128807 147
Industrial
(23) Light Manufacturing 60167 532046 41
(24) Heavy Manufacturing 2973 1085721 65924
(25) Lumber Yards/Sawmills 2422 485157 64
(26) Food Packing Plants 2441 530035 66
(27) Canneries/Distilleries/Wineries 617 931556 175
(28) Food Processing 1470 693930 76
(29) Mineral Processing 2288 1056428 289
(30) Warehousing and Storage 142686 685858 63
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Table 2.3: Euclidean and Network distance results using Model (1).
Euclidean Model Network Model
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Land Use (1) 0.13*** 0.004 0.13*** 0.004
Land Use (2) -0.23*** 0.005 -0.23*** 0.005
Land Use (3) 0.60*** 0.010 0.60*** 0.010
Land Use (4) 0.89*** 0.007 0.89*** 0.007
Land Use (5) 0.02*** 0.004 0.02*** 0.004
Land Use (6) -0.02*** 0.005 -0.03*** 0.005
Land Use (7) 0.36*** 0.021 0.28*** 0.021
Land Use (8) 0.41*** 0.005 0.41*** 0.005
Land Use (9) 0.61*** 0.008 0.06*** 0.008
Land Use (10) 0.12*** 0.004 0.12*** 0.004
Land Use (11) 0.54*** 0.007 0.54*** 0.007
Land Use (12) 0.13*** 0.017 0.14*** 0.017
Land Use (13) -0.27*** 0.023 -0.25*** 0.023
Land Use (14) 0.55*** 0.103 0.56*** 0.103
Land Use (15) 0.56*** 0.032 0.60*** 0.032
Land Use (16) 0.09*** 0.011 0.09*** 0.011
Land Use (17) 0.33*** 0.020 0.32*** 0.020
Land Use (18) 0.18*** 0.023 0.20*** 0.023
Land Use (19) 0.64*** 0.023 0.68*** 0.023
Land Use (20) 0.23*** 0.058 0.22*** 0.059
Land Use (21) 0.95*** 0.016 0.94*** 0.016
Land Use (22) 0.75*** 0.007 0.74*** 0.007
Land Use (23) 0.08*** 0.005 0.08*** 0.005
Land Use (24) 0.15*** 0.019 0.14*** 0.019
Land Use (25) 0.31*** 0.020 0.32*** 0.020
Land Use (26) 0.26*** 0.021 0.26*** 0.021
Land Use (27) 0.65*** 0.041 0.64*** 0.042
Land Use (28) 0.06** 0.026 0.06** 0.026
Land Use (29) 0.33*** 0.023 0.33*** 0.022
Observations 1012531 1012531
R2 0.586 0.595
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
expected, building size and lot size are both positive and statistically significant,
given that larger tracts of land and buildings will generally cost more. Both
have decreasing returns though, as noted by the negative squared terms on
each. While the literature generally finds little correlations between industrial
land price and CBD distance, the statistical significance found here can be
accounted for the much larger number of commercial structures compared to
industrial land. As prior research has indicated, moving away from the CBD
is associated with a drop in the value of land. Similarly, coastal locations are
highly valuable; even for non-residential structures, but this effect falls off once
a plot of land is half a mile or more inland.
Both the Euclidean and Network distance measures show similar signs on
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the distance variables of interest. Land values are positively correlated with
hospital and fire station distance. This indicates that movement away from
these stations will lead to positive capitalization effects. The negative sign on
police stations shows that land values are negatively correlated with distance
away from police stations. In other words, on average, non-residential structures
prefer to be further away from hospitals and fire stations, but closer to police
stations. Essentially, the loss of disamenity effects from noise, traffic congestion,
and unsightly buildings tend to dominate the loss of amenity affects from fire
stations and hospitals. Note that the negative coefficient on the square terms
for hospitals and fire stations does indicate that this movement away has a
diminishing effect, and eventually reverses course. This likely corresponds with
the point at which the disamenity effects generated by the station have basically
reached zero. However, police stations provide enough value (or conversely, they
have a smaller negative ‘footprint’) that, all else being equal, non-residential
land values will be higher near police stations. This particularly make sense
if commercial or industrial structures are targeted by criminals at a relatively
high rate compared to the likelihood of accidents or fire.
As previously noted though, each land use designation may have its own
preferences for distance from these stations. Table 2.5 provides a summary of
model (2) with Euclidean distance measure to analyze how each land use cate-
gory effects land prices with respect to the distance from the nearest fire station.9
9 of 22 commercial land designations are found to have a positive correlation
between distance from the nearest fire stations and land prices. These nine
categories; single story stores, malls, restaurants, produce and flora businesses,
tourist attractions, racing, golf courses, and hotels, all evidence a preference for
9Network distance measurements using model (2) found nearly identical results.
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Table 2.4: Continued Euclidean and Network distance results using Model (1).
Euclidean Model Network Model
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Hospital Distance 3.78e-5*** 2.42e-6 3.09e-5*** 2.55e-6
Hospital Distance2 -1.60e-9*** 1.13e-10 -1.81e-9*** 1.68e-10
Hospital Distance3 1.48e-14*** 1.04e-15 2.22e-14*** 2.42e-15
Fire Distance 1.36e-5*** 3.68e-6 5.42e-6* 3.03e-6
Fire Distance2 -3.46e-9*** 7.78e-10 -1.76e-9*** 4.87e-10
Fire Distance3 1.22e-14*** 3.48e-14 4.47e-14*** 1.67e-14
Police Distance -1.02e-5*** 2.50e-6 -9.27e-6*** 2.26e-6
Police Distance2 -6.34e-11 2.11e-10 -1.39e-10 1.78e-10
Police Distance3 -1.00e-15 3.07e-15 1.14e-15 2.63e-15
Building Size 1.00e-5*** 3.24e-8 1.01e-5*** 3.23e-8
Building Size2 -3.07e-12*** 1.49e-14 -3.07e-12*** 1.48e-14
Lot Size 4.35e-6*** 3.88e-8 4.37e-6*** 3.92e-8
Lot Size2 -9.75e-13*** 1.69e-14 -9.70e-13*** 1.60e-14
Age -1.92e-4 1.89e-4 -1.66e-4 1.89e-4
Age2 -8.66e-5*** 2.37e-6 -8.66e-5*** 2.37e-6
CBD Distance -2.81e-6 2.02e-6 -1.05e-5*** 2.66e-6
CBD Distance2 -1.93e-10*** 6.48e-11 1.46e-10** 7.07e-11
CBD Distance3 9.04e-16** 4.16e-16 -9.13e-16** 4.38e-16
Coast 5m 0.607*** 0.012 0.671*** 0.013
Coast 25m 0.447*** 0.015 0.494*** 0.015
Coast 50m 0.333*** 0.014 0.376*** 0.014
Coast 100m 0.218*** 0.012 0.257*** 0.012
Coast 200m 0.202*** 0.010 0.249*** 0.011
Coast 500m 0.067*** 0.009 0.106*** 0.010
Coast 1000m 0.007 0.009 -0.040*** 0.009
Coast 2000m -0.018** 0.008 0.007 0.008
Observations 1012531 1012531
R2 0.586 0.595
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (All distances measured in meters.)
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Table 2.5: Euclidean fire station distances using interaction terms.
Land Use Fire Distance Fire Distance2 Fire Distance3
(1) Single Story Stores +* + -
(2) Mixed Store and Offices -* +* -*
(3) Department Store/Supermarkets -* + -
(4) Malls and Shopping Centers - +* -*
(5) Non-Professional Service Offices -* +* -*
(6) Professional Service Buildings -* ** -*
(7) Transportation Terminals -* + -
(8) Restaurants +* -* +*
(9) Financial and Insurance -* +* -*
(10) Repair, Service, and Auto Sales -* +* -*
(11) Parking Lots/Mobile Home Sales -* + +
(12) Outlets and Produce Houses - +* -*
(13) Florists and Greenhouses +* -* +*
(14) Open Air Entertainment + - +
(15) Enclosed Auditoriums/Theaters + -* +*
(16) Nightclubs and Bars -* +* -*
(17) Daytime Attractions/Arenas -* + -
(18) Tourist Attractions +* -* +*
(19) Camps + - -
(20) Racing + - +*
(21) Golf Courses +* -* +*
(22) Hotels or Motels +* -* +*
(23) Light Manufacturing - +* -*
(24) Heavy Manufacturing + -* +*
(25) Lumber Yards/Sawmills -* + -*
(26) Food Packing Plants +* -* +*
(27) Canneries/Distilleries/Wineries +* -* +*
(28) Food Processing +* -* +*
(29) Mineral Processing +* -* +*
(30) Warehousing and Storage -* +* -*
*: p < 0.10 (Full results available upon request.)
being further away from fire stations where possible. Each of the other 13 land
use categories have land values that increase with proximity to a fire station, or
are uncorrelated with distance.
Industrial land prices correlate positively, on average, with increasing fire sta-
tion distance. Land prices increase with distance from the nearest fire station for
five of the eight industrial designations; light manufacturing, food packing and
processing, distilleries and wineries, and mineral processing. Only heavy man-
ufacturing, lumber yards, and warehousing had strong preferences for locating
near fire stations. These three industrial land designations possibly encompass
the types of structures that house activities that may be more susceptible to
fire or injury.
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As can be seen, even within the broad definition of commercial or indus-
trial land usage, there are heterogeneous effects. Even the magnitude of these
capitalization effects differ from one land use category to the next. Figure 2.4
compares two somewhat similar retail buildings, restaurants versus nightclubs
and bars. Nightclubs and bar are correlated with higher prices the closer they
are to a fire station, however, restaurants see the value of the land increase when
moving further away from a fire station. The average non-residential valuations
with respect to fire distance from model (1) are also shown here. Restaurant
capitalization effects are more closely aligned with the average non-residential
structure than nightclubs and bars. Similarly, tourist attractions exhibit the
largest commercial increase in land value per meter increase in distance from a
fire station, while professional service buildings exhibit the largest loss in land
value. Figure 2.5 provides a visual demonstration of this. Land values of tourist
attractions can increase by as much as 5 percent if a neighboring fire station
were moved 3,000 meters away. Conversely, moving a fire station 2,500 meters
away from a professional services building may reduce the value of its land by
2 percent.
Table 2.6 provides the results of using model (2) when considering distances
from the nearest hospital. A larger majority of commercial land use categories
negatively associate distance away from a hospital with land prices. In par-
ticular, only parking lots, enclosed auditoriums/theaters, camping areas, and
hotels have positive coefficients. These results indicate that most commercial
locations tend to value land near hospitals. Logically, this make sense, partic-
ularly for any businesses that cater to hospital employees since many hospitals
employ large numbers of workers.10 Similarly, industrial valuations are largely
10“... ‘eds and meds’are proven economic engines. They employ large workforces, occupy
and manage big pieces of real estate, purchase vast quantities of goods and services...”see
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of fire station effects between Nightclubs and Restau-
rants.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of fire station effects between Tourist Attractions and
Professional Services.
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Table 2.6: Euclidean Hospital distances using interaction terms.
Land Use Hospital Distance Hospital Distance2 Hospital Distance3
(1) Single Story Stores -* +* -*
(2) Mixed Store and Offices -* +* -*
(3) Department Store/Supermarkets + + -
(4) Malls and Shopping Centers -* +* -*
(5) Non-Professional Service Offices -* +* -*
(6) Professional Service Buildings -* +* -*
(7) Transportation Terminals -* +* -*
(8) Restaurants - + -
(9) Financial and Insurance -* +* -*
(10) Repair, Service, and Auto Sales -* +* -*
(11) Parking Lots/Mobile Home Sales +* -* +*
(12) Outlets and Produce Houses + - +
(13) Florists and Greenhouses - + -
(14) Open Air Entertainment - - -
(15) Enclosed Auditoriums/Theaters +* -* +*
(16) Nightclubs and Bars -* +* -*
(17) Daytime Attractions/Arenas -* +* -*
(18) Tourist Attractions -* +* -*
(19) Camps +* -* +
(20) Racing + - +
(21) Golf Courses - -* +*
(22) Hotels or Motels +* + -*
(23) Light Manufacturing -* +* -*
(24) Heavy Manufacturing -* +* -*
(25) Lumber Yards/Sawmills - + -*
(26) Food Packing Plants -* +* -*
(27) Canneries/Distilleries/Wineries -** +* -*
(28) Food Processing - - +
(29) Mineral Processing -* +* -*
(30) Warehousing and Storage -* +* -*
*: p < 0.10 (Full results available upon request.)
negatively correlated with distance away from hospitals. Only food processing
plants are found to be unaffected by hospital distance. One likely explana-
tion is that most industrial usage has little need for quiet locations, so they
are relatively unconcerned by the disamenity effects from hospitals, but have
strong preferences for quick responses in the case of industrial accidents. Of
the three types of services, hospitals provide the lowest heterogeneity amongst
the land usage classifications. In addition, the magnitudes of the associated
capitalization effects are smaller than for either fire stations or police stations.
Finally, Table 2.7 shows the capitalization effects of police stations using
model (2). Although the dispersion of negative and positive signs is greater
than hospitals, and more akin to fire stations, a few specific types of land des-
Anchors Lift All Boats, Land Lines (2015).
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Table 2.7: Euclidean police station distances using interaction terms.
Land Use Police Distance Police Distance2 Police Distance3
(1) Single Story Stores + - -
(2) Mixed Store and Offices -* +* -*
(3) Department Store/Supermarkets +* -* +*
(4) Malls and Shopping Centers -* - +*
(5) Non-Professional Service Offices -* +* -*
(6) Professional Service Buildings -* +* -*
(7) Transportation Terminals + -* -*
(8) Restaurants -* - +
(9) Financial and Insurance -* + +
(10) Repair, Service, and Auto Sales -* + +
(11) Parking Lots/Mobile Home Sales - - +
(12) Outlets and Produce Houses -* + -
(13) Florists and Greenhouses -* +* -*
(14) Open Air Entertainment + - +
(15) Enclosed Auditoriums/Theaters +* -* +
(16) Nightclubs and Bars +* -* +*
(17) Daytime Attractions/Arenas +* - +
(18) Tourist Attractions +* -* +*
(19) Camps -* +* -*
(20) Racing -* +* -*
(21) Golf Courses +* + -*
(22) Hotels or Motels -* + +
(23) Light Manufacturing -* -* +*
(24) Heavy Manufacturing -* +* -*
(25) Lumber Yards/Sawmills +* -* +*
(26) Food Packing Plants -* +* -
(27) Canneries/Distilleries/Wineries + - +
(28) Food Processing +* -* +*
(29) Mineral Processing + - +
(30) Warehousing and Storage -* +* -*
*: p < 0.10 (Full results available upon request.)
ignations deserve mention. Nightclubs and bars prefer the presence of hospitals
and fire stations, but generally would like to avoid proximity to police stations.
In particular, worries over drunk driving or public intoxication may drive adult-
oriented nightlife away from businesses near police stations. A similar, but
opposite effect occurs with warehousing and storage land. Warehousing gener-
ally prefers the police stations, but does not value fire or hospital access. Hotels
and motels derive higher capitalization effects in proximity to police stations as
well, but prefer to avoid fire stations or hospitals.
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2.5 Conclusion
While land use designations have been broadly considered in the capitalization
literature, the research presented here demonstrates the importance of consid-
ering disaggregated measures of land use. In particular, even within broad
categories of commercial or industrial land usage, there are examples of both
positive and negative capitalization effects to the same service. Understanding
and account for this heterogeneity is important for analyzing how non-residential
structures respond to service access. These capitalization effects are not only
heterogeneous in magnitude, but in sign as well.
Consider the case of golf courses. While one might imagine that golf courses
in general would be worth less in high traffic, high noise locations, this does not
tell the whole story. This train of thought is true for the disamenities associated
with police and fire stations, but not for hospitals.11 Any analysis considering
commercial capitalization effects that does not disaggregate land usage may find
their coefficients being effects by the inclusion of heterogeneous preferences.
Additionally, while not all commercial or industrial parcels will capitalize
emergency service access into land values, many of them do. These effect can
range from minor 1 percent price changes, to much more significant 5 or more
percent changes in land value with the construction of a new service station.
Given the high value associated with each non-residential parcel, these changes
are not trivial in nature. As such, the evidence provided here indicates that
when considering the construction of a new fire station or police station, local
municipalities should consider the businesses that will be effected. A new station
will likely create both winners and losers, so taking these effects into account
11Perhaps the many lightning strikes that Florida receives ensures the value of having a
hospital near a golf course.
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are particularly important for municipalities concerned over revenue generation.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Overrides and Local
Budget Composition
As municipalities across the United States struggle with raising revenues to meet
continued budgetary obligations, it becomes more important to understand how
municipalities react when dealing with fiscal constraint. California’s Proposition
13, passed in 1978, limited ad valorem taxes on property to 1 percent of the
property’s cash value. The passage of this law, for good or ill, has led to a
number of consequences in the state1. Four decades after Proposition 13, states
are still enacting or editing similar laws (as recently as 2010 and 2012 in New
Jersey and Oklahoma respectively). These laws are generally meant to force
local governments to reduce or streamline service provision and to provide fiscal
reprieve to fixed income homeowners for whom increasing property tax rates
may result in being priced out of their homes (Ladd and Wilson, 1982).
The research presented here attempts to understand how local municipalities
will respond when in the presence of fiscal limitations. This becomes even more
important given recent political pressures to reduce government size and taxes
while maintaining service provision levels. Fallout from the recent recession has
even led to revenue and expenditure reductions in some locations (Congressional
Budget Office, 2010).
1See Rosen (1982) Rosen (1982) and Sexton, Sheffrin, and O’Sullivan (1999) Sexton, Shef-
frin and O’Sullivan (1999).
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Using data from Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 1
2
and information on votes to
increase property tax revenues at the local level, it becomes possible to investi-
gate how local budget composition changes in the presence of fiscal constraint.
Specifically, a regression discontinuity design utilizing ballot initiatives that just
barely pass versus those that barely fail can be exploited to analyze whether
(and how) municipalities react to fiscal limitations. Part of Massachusetts’ prop-
erty tax cap law also provides for more than one method to override levy limits,
allowing researchers to uncover whether certain types of overrides may generate
differential responses in local budget composition.
Additionally, one issue with investigating the response of municipal bud-
gets to fiscal constraint is that difficulties arise in states where the constraint is
provided at a parcel level, because identifying whether a municipality is truly
fiscally constrained can be problematic. For example, as millage rates are en-
dogenously chosen, two municipalities may have the same revenue and expen-
diture levels, but one may be content with its current budget choices, but the
other is not. This preference may not be readily visibly from budget or mil-
lage rate choices. However, Massachusetts’ program enables the identification
of these fiscally constrained municipalities through their choice of holding fiscal
override votes. If a jurisdiction is fiscally constrained, then it is will be more
likely to hold a vote overriding levy limits. Municipalities that are not fiscally
constrained should be expected not to hold revenue increasing votes. There-
fore confidence can be higher that fiscally constrained municipalities have been
identified when restricting the analysis to those locales attempting to override
their levy limits2.
2Note that holding a vote is not enough to identify fiscal constraint given that some juris-
dictions may choose to initiate a vote in preparation for future expenditures. An additional
consideration therefore, is whether the municipality both initiated a vote, but also chose to
raise the requested revenue at the same time and to utilize any remaining levy limit availability
68
Two important findings are established here. First, municipal governments
will respond to fiscal constraint by altering budgetary composition. On aver-
age, municipalities that receive increased funding from overrides, but are still
fiscally constrained will spend a smaller portion of their budget on education
and a larger proportion on public works expenditures3. Also, while spend-
ing proportions change, in real expenditure terms, education remains the same
while public works spending increases. Secondly, this effect is limited to only
permanent overrides. In essence, overrides that provide more flexibility in rev-
enue generation will tend to lead to budgets that under emphasize education
as opposed to alternative override measures which may still provide increased
revenue generation, but are less flexible in usage. One possible result is that
fiscal constraint overrides may induce budget composition changes that are not
necessarily aligned with voter preferences, but instead such budgets may em-
phasize more ‘visible’ expenditures. As such, when designing property tax caps,
legislatures should pay particular attention to what override tools are provided
to municipalities.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief background of
Massachusetts’ property tax cap law. Section II discusses prior research into
property taxes and local budgets. The methodology employed here is laid out
in Section III, while Section IV discusses the results. Section V concludes.
left.
3Public works budgets contain expenditures on streets and highways, snow and ice, waste
and sewage, and water distribution.
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3.1 Background
Massachusetts’ property tax law (known as Proposition 2 1
2
) of 1980 enacted
several limitations on local revenue generation from property taxes4. In partic-
ular, it created two limits; a levy limit and a levy ceiling. The levy limit sets
a limit of 2.5 percent year over year growth on property taxes, while the levy
ceiling limits the total amount of property taxes that may be collected to no
more than 2.5 percent of all assessed real and personal property in the jurisdic-
tion. Importantly, municipalities can choose how much of each year’s increase
in the levy limit they collect. If there is no perceived need to increase taxation,
then a jurisdiction can choose to hold off on increasing revenue. However, the
law also recognizes that municipalities may need more fiscal flexibility in some
circumstances. As such, Proposition 2 1
2
includes two methods of providing
jurisdictions with increased revenue options.
The most general method is known as an override. Overrides are explicitly
required to have both a purpose and a specific dollar amount. They are placed
on local ballots and voted upon, with a simple majority vote required to pass.
An important aspect of overrides is that they are permanent in nature. Upon
enacting an override, a municipality’s levy limit is immediately raised by the
aforementioned dollar value, and in subsequent years, the override amount is
increased by the same 2.5 percent each year. In essence, an override enables a
jurisdiction to increase their revenue generating ability as well as their future
revenue generation. However, overrides have one limiting factor, they cannot
increase a levy limit beyond the municipality’s levy ceiling.5
4See Cutler, Elmendorf and Zeckhauser (1999) Cutler, Elmendorf and Zeckhauser (1999)
for a discussion on why Massachusetts voters passed Proposition 2 12 , and why voters might
choose to override the law’s revenue generation limitations.
5There also exists an option known as an underride in which the municipality’s levy limit
is reduced by the balloted amount. Only 18 overrides were voted on during the period of
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On the other hand, debt and capital exclusions are able to allow local gov-
ernments to raise revenues above and beyond their levy ceiling. Similar to
overrides, exclusions are ballot measures that pass on simple majority votes,
and are required to list their expected uses and dollar amounts (in the case of
capital exclusions). They differ from overrides in that exclusions are temporary
in nature. Any increase to a levy limit by exclusions will only last so long as the
project is still in progress, and importantly, is not factored into the 2.5 percent
annual levy limit increase. As such, exclusions are not only limited in nature
(debt or capital projects only), but also in time.
Given that both forms of own-source revenue generation must state what
the funds will be used for, why would there be any expectation for budget
shifting that isn’t already defined by the override or exclusion itself? As noted
by Zampelli (1986) Zampelli (1986), Becker (1996) Becker (1996), and Fisher
and Papke (2000) Fisher and Papke (2000), budget fungibility can be found
in local budget choices. A decision to increase expenditures in one area of a
budget does not preclude the possibility of shifting other funds away from the
same area. If local budget officials choose to transfer expenditures around the
budget, then they may be able to use an override or exclusion vote to raise
expenditures in parts of the budget the officials would prefer. These preferred
areas of the budget might include expenditures in public works or other highly
‘visible’ budget areas.6 A possible reason for municipal budget composition to
change may derive from budget officials wishing to increase their chances for
re-election by providing expenditure increases to budget areas that can effect
the largest contingent of potential voters.
analysis. They are not considered here.
6See the Theory section for details.
71
3.2 Literature Review
Prior studies have examined a few effects of fiscal constraints on local budget
choices. Dye and McGuire (1997) Dye and McGuire (1997) use a property tax
cap program in Illinois to analyze whether caps are effective in reducing property
tax growth rates. The authors are able to utilize a differential application of the
program to demonstrate that property tax caps are, in fact, an effective means
of reducing property tax growth. They also note that educational expenditures
tend to become restrained in capped districts, however the reduction appears
to be limited to non-instructional spending.
Bradbury, Mayer, and Case (2001) Bradbury, Mayer and Case (2001) and
Wallin and Zabel (2011) Wallin and Zabel (2011) discuss the effects of Propo-
sition 2 1
2
on education expenditures, local fiscal conditions, and school seg-
regation respectively. Bradbury, Mayer and Case (2001) utilize revenue and
expenditure data from 1990 through 1994 and a large (30 percent) reduction
in state aid to investigate whether the existence of fiscal constraint limited ex-
penditures, and more significantly, if the reduction was achieved by targeting
education expenditures. Their analysis also notes that municipalities that chose
to cut education spending tended to see a negative impact on housing prices
compared to communities that were able to avoid such expenditure reductions.
This coincides with Glaeser (1996) Glaeser (1996) wherein the author argues
that property taxes indicate expectations for future amenity procurement. If
these property taxes are lowered, then there should be a consequential effect
on housing prices, lowering them as expectations of amenities fall. Wallin and
Zabel (2011) uses data from Massachusetts after passing Proposition 2 1
2
to
predict whether override measures help relieve fiscal pressures. They find that
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local fiscal conditions, as measured by total revenues minus expenses, tend to
improve with the passage of overrides. Additionally, towns with better fiscal
conditions not only tended to pass overrides more often, but also voted on them
more often as well. Jeffrey (2014) ? also notes that one unintended consequence
of these overrides is that they tend to increase school segregation since override
votes have a tendency to pass more often in higher income towns with lower
percentages of minorities.
A survey of Wisconsin municipalities by Mahar and Deller (2007) Mahar
and Deller (2007) discusses the relationship between local government percep-
tions and reality of local fiscal stress. They note that municipalities with fiscal
directors or administrators tended to respond to fiscal stress through different
means (such as management improvements, and service consolidation) com-
pared to other municipalities. The authors also include an overview of prior
literature analyzing responses to fiscal stress. Buettner and Wildasin (2006)
Buettner and Wildasin (2006) provides evidence that municipalities adjust to
fiscal imbalances by reducing future expenditures, though the magnitude of the
effect is asymmetrical on population size. Intergovernmental grants are also
found to be an important source of municipal decision making, especially as
local officials appear to utilize these transfers to ease fiscal adjustment periods.
This paper improves upon municipal budget research through two contribu-
tions. One, it investigates the effect of overrides on local budget composition
by considering the percentage of municipal budgets enacted toward five major
areas; education, health and welfare, public safety, public works, and recreation
and culture7. Considering the impact that these expenditure decisions make on
local conditions (see Oates (1969) Oates (1969)), it is important to understand
7On average, these five budget items account for about 75 percent of all municipal expenses.
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how policies can alter these expenditure choices. During the period from 1992
until 2009, there were 6,507 votes for overrides and exclusions, of which 4,158
passed with an average value of $249,000, indicating that these overrides are
neither rare nor minor. The second major contribution is to use a regression
discontinuity design to analyze how overrides effect these decisions. The usage
of an RD methodology allows the analysis to be quasi-experimental in nature,
which can help temper the many endogeneity problems that local budget choice
can generate.
3.3 Theory
This section outlines a basic theoretical discussion of budgetary decision making
in circumstances with majority rule voting and imperfect knowledge. Suppose a
voter is making a decision on whether to vote for an incumbent or a challenger.
If it is assumed that voters are self-interested insofar as they vote based upon
their utility preferences, then it would be expected that the candidate the voter
will chose can be defined as:
E[µi(Sc)] > E[µi(S−c)] (3.1)
Where the expected utility from candidate c’s choice of service provision level
S is greater than the utility voter i expects from any and all other candidates’
choices of service provision levels. If voters tend to fall along a spectrum of
preferences, then there should be a set of voters for whom the the difference
between their preference for the incumbent politician (I ) and their second best
choice (-I ) is arbitrarily (ε) small. These voters can be defined as the marginal
voters:
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E[µmv(SI)]− E[µmv(S−I)] = ε (3.2)
Note that ε can be either positive or negative depending on the marginal
voter’s most preferred candidate. Given that voters will vote their preferred






 1 if E[µi(Sc)] > E[µi(S−c)]0 if E[µi(S−c)] > E[µi(Sc)]
As noted by Drazen and Eslava (2010) Drazen and Eslava (2010), local
officials have incentives to alter the composition of municipal budgets to affect
their final vote totals. In particular, when given a boost to revenue generation
through an override or exclusion passage, local officials may want to target new
expenditures toward the marginal voter groups. They would prefer to target
marginal voters because such voters require a smaller change to their utility to
push them from supporting one candidate to another.
If local budget officials had perfect knowledge of voter preferences, then in-
cumbents could easily alter budgetary composition to maximize the likelihood
of being re-elected by targeting expenditures toward the marginal voters. How-
ever, this assumption may be a bit strong when considering this in a more
empirical fashion. With the existence of an asymmetric information problem, it
becomes difficult for local officials to target expenditures toward the marginal
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voters. Therefore, if a candidate wishes to target as many marginal voters as
possible, then modifying the budget composition to improve the utility of as
many voters as possible might create the largest shift in marginal voters toward
the candidate.
Consider two possible projects, α and β. For any change in expenditure to
either of these projects, the utility for a voter will change as:
∆µi = a∆Sα,i + b∆Sβ,i (3.4)
Where a and b representing the preference strength for either policy choice.
Conditional on an individual receiving a benefit from either policy choice, it
can be seen that for any change in expenditures, an individual’s utility will
increase based on two factors, their marginal preference for the increase, and
the magnitude of the increase. In a situation in which there is no increase in
expenditures or if an individual has zero marginal preference, then utility will
not change.
From the perspective of local officials without perfect knowledge, they must
predict an individual’s change in utility through estimation of probabilities.
In particular, candidates must consider that they do not know with certainty
whether an expenditure increase will even lead to a consequent increase in utility.
Therefore, to make a decision between two different policies, local officials must
consider the probability of a voter receiving a benefit from enacting a particular
project α:
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pα = E[Pr(kα)|α = 1] (3.5)
qα = E[Pr(kα)|α = 0] (3.6)
Recall that the policy decision with the greatest affect on Vc (3) will be
the one that maximizes the number of marginal voters whose preferences can
be flipped from the challenger or challengers to the incumbent. Local budget
officials will therefore recognize that for projects α and β, the expected change
in utility for a marginal voter will be proportional to the probability of the voter
being effected by either of these projects:
E[∆µmv] ∝ Prα(a∆Sα,mv) + Prβ(b∆Sβ,mv) (3.7)
While the candidate has no power (or may even have no knowledge) over
deciding a or b for a marginal voter, the candidate can however choose projects
with a higher probability Pr(k). The advantage of this can be seen by con-
sidering two competing policy decisions. Assuming that expenditures on each
project are the same and that returns to scale are similar across the two projects
then the effect of a change in expenditures from period 0 to period 1 will be:8
∆µmv = pα[a(Eα,1 − Eα,0)] + pβ[a(Eβ,1 − Eβ,0)] (3.8)
8Obviously, if there are services that are facing increasing or decreasing returns to scale,
then this might alter the outcome slightly. However, it should be noted that this should only
alter the mixture of policy choices, not necessarily the underlying idea of targeting at many
marginal voters as possible. One would expect that services with decreasing returns to scale
will need a larger probability of effect or greater expected marginal preference boost to be
considered as a first best choice. Increasing returns to scale for a service would make it easier
for a local budget official to decide to implement said policy.
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If the local budget official wants to decide the breakeven point for making
the choice between the two possibilities, then (8) can be rearranged as:
∆µmv = ∆µα,mv + ∆µβ,mv (3.9)
∆µα,mv = pα[a(Eα,1 − Eα,0)] (3.10)
∆µβ,mv = pβ[a(Eβ,1 − Eβ,0)] (3.11)




(12) demonstrates how important the expected probability can be in deter-
mining a first best choice for the policy maker. For a first best choice, let the
left hand side be greater than 1. This will occur in circumstances in which the
probability of policy α is high compared to policy β. As can be seen both a and
b are also determinants of the first best choice. However, the policy maker may
not have full knowledge of voter preference strengths until after the election.
If the candidate has strong a priori beliefs that β  α, then policy β may
be a better choice. All things being equal however, for any two generic policy
choices, one with a larger p will be preferable.
In this case, what can be determined about likely policy decisions for a
candidate in a re-election cycle? If the policy maker wants to target as many
marginal voters as possible, then they would prefer to implement policies with
a higher p. Policies that are in effect more visible or that potential voters have
more contact with would likely generate higher p values. This may lead to local
officials deciding to emphasize budget movements toward public works projects.
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Increased expenditures on road maintenance and lighting are more likely to
positively effect a marginal voter than education expenditures for which there
may be segments of the population that generate little to no utility gains from
expenditure increases9. This gives rise to the basis behind the results found
in this paper. In essence, for communities that pass overrides, local budget
officials face an incentive to increase expenditures on public works (a plausibly
high p valued policy) rather than education. Choosing certain policies may be
even more highly incentivized if local officials wish to appear as though they are
‘accomplishing’ something (i.e. disguising themselves as people type politicians
noted by Drazen and Eslava).
This however isn’t the entire story. As noted previously, only in the case
of permanent overrides is this effect captured in the data. Therefore, in the
case of temporary capital exclusion votes, why might officials no longer have
an incentive to alter budget composition? Recall in (2) and (3) that marginal
voters will choose their vote based upon whether they expect to receive more
utility from one candidate versus another. For the analysis so far there has been
no mention of the loss in utility that an increase in tax rates would bring. In the
case of an override situation, this tax increase occurs regardless of the winner
of a subsequent election. As such, the distribution of voters should not change
since the tax increase is independent of whether an individual voter prefers the
incumbent or the challenger.
Upon passing a capital exclusion, the tax increase is recognized by voters
as being temporary in nature. For incumbent policy makers, it now becomes
9One may imagine older voters or middle-aged commuters preferring increased road main-
tenance and street lighting compared to education expenditures. This many not always be
the case. For example, given that local officials may face a populace that has intense prefer-
ences for education expenditures, then the marginal voter may be more likely to be swayed
by budget compositions with increased emphasis on education. It is important to understand
that on average higher p policies are probably more likely to be preferable.
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a more risky proposition to choose to alter budget compositions in response to
the temporary increase. This is because voters may recognize that voting for
the challenger may result in higher utility levels due to the return of lower tax
rates after the capital exclusion period is over. In order to effectively target
marginal voters, the policy makers must not only consider whether a policy will
have a high p, but also whether it would generate enough utility to overcome
the voter’s preference for lower tax rates under a different regime. Thus, local
budget officials may recognize that altering budget compositions can create
more harm than good for their re-election chances, resulting in a decision to not
change local budget compositions.
3.4 Methodology
Given the following model:
(1) Yi = θγi + βXi + εi
Where X is a vector of covariates and γ is our variable of interest, in this case,
a binary variable indicating passage of an override10. A typical linear regression
would return a biased coefficient (θ) on γ as city specific characteristics are
likely to be correlated with both γ and the error term, ε. This creates difficulty
in establishing a statistically pleasing relationship between γ and Y.
However, prior work has demonstrated the value of using an RD design when
utilizing treatment data11. While the passage of a ballot initiative is certainly
nonrandom in nature, if one limits the analysis to only those contests that
10The variable determining the passage of an override, voter share, is sometimes referred
to as the ‘forcing variable’. Forcing variables are generally continuous in nature, and can be
used to identify how close a ballot measure came to passage or failure.
11See Thistlewaite and Campbell (1960) Thistlewaite and Campbell (1960), Angrist and
Lavy (1999) Angrist and Lavy (1999), and Lee and Lemieux (2010) Lee and Lemieux (2010).
80
are sufficiently close to the passage mark, the investigation begins to approach
a randomized experiment. This can provide a valuable means to establish a
causal relationship between γ and Y in (1). In essence, if the treatment effect
is distributed randomly amongst the sample, then this effectively generates two
groups, those with an override passage (the treatment group), and those without
an override passage (the control group). It then becomes possible to compare
these two groups to uncover whether treatment has an effect (also known as
treatment on the treated or TOT) on municipal budget composition.
Of course, there are no free statistical lunches. RD methods must meet
certain criteria to be a valid approximation of a randomized experiment. The
caveats to RD usage fall into two categories; discontinuity validation and group
differences. For discontinuity validation, individuals must not be able to alter
the variable determining treatment assignment (in this case, vote share), and
there must not be discrete jumps in voter share within close proximity of the
discontinuity. General practice when considering ballot measures with an RD
design, is to ensure that individual power to determine voting outcomes is rela-
tively small by removing smaller voting populaces12. Smaller voting pools tend
to lead to instances in which it becomes more likely that one or two voters can
influence the assignment of treatment.
Discrete changes in voter share near the discontinuity of interest may in-
dicate a situation in which endogenous sorting may bias results. So long as
any discrete jumps in the forcing variable are far enough away from the dis-
continuity, then RD designs can still approximate a randomized experiment. A
histogram can indicate whether any discrete jumps lie near the discontinuity
12See Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010). For
the following analysis, any municipality with fewer than 100 votes has been removed from the
dataset. This filter reduces the ballot county by 219 total votes or 3 percent of all override
and exclusion votes.
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of all override types as a percent of voter share.
point. As demonstrated by Figure 3.1; the votes under consideration in this
paper appear to have a discrete jump problem, with a large drop off near the
50 percent voter share mark.
However, by breaking down the votes into debt exclusion votes (Figure 3.2)
and all other votes (Figure 3.3), it can be seen that the discrete jump problem
is a result of debt exclusion votes, and not a product of the ballot measures in
general. By limiting the analysis to overrides and capital exclusion votes, one
may be reasonably certain that there are no discrete jumps in the immediate
vicinity of the discontinuity.
To evaluate the effect of overrides on local budget composition, two RD
models will be utilized. In both, the sample will be constrained to those munic-
ipalities that are already extremely close to the levy limit to ensure conditions
of fiscal constraint13. The first will consist of a local linear regression model.
13This is a necessary condition to enforce fiscal constraint. In cases where municipalities
have flexibility in their expenditure choices by being under the levy limit, then local budget
officials may no longer have an incentive to alter budget composition since they can easily
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of debt exclusions as a percent of voter share.
Figure 3.3: Histogram of all both overrides and capital exclusions as a percent
of voter share.
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This model will only use observations from within the immediate vicinity of the
discontinuity using a bandwidth chosen by minimizing the mean squared error.
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) discusses
this methodology further. The local linear method is modeled as follows:
(2) Yi = θγi + εi
Where γ is a dummy variable denoting treatment assignment. θ provides
the effect of the treatment on the treated. In this case, θ will show how the
passage of an override or capital exclusion alters local budget composition. As
per (Lee and Lemieux, 2010), multiple models can help demonstrate robustness
and provide more evidence of the final results. To this end, a polynomial RD
method will be utilized as well. In this form, the sample will not be filtered,
and will include both observations near the discontinuity, but also those further
away.
(3) Yi = θγi + β1Γ
2 + ...+ βnΓ
n + εi
Where Γ represents a continuous form of the assignment variable (i.e. voter
share). The inclusion of an nth degree polynomial can help soak up variation
away from the discontinuity. A polynomial RD method can provide a more
powerful test than a local linear analysis since it is able to utilize more observa-
tions, but there may be concerns of bias even with a higher degree polynomial.
Thus, both (2) and (3) are included in the final results to provide corroborating
evidence of the effects of overrides on budget choices.
increase expenditures as needed. Indeed, analyses allowing for the inclusion of non-fiscally
constrained municipalities find no statistically significant effects. Thus, the sample is limited
to communities with no more than 1.5 percent of their maximum levy limit left.
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Table 3.1: Select summary statistics.
All Votes 5 Percent Bandwidth
Variable Pass Fail Pass Fail
Population 7772.8* 9258.8* 9572.5 9270.6
(10974.00) (13167.3) (16383.5) (13722.7)
Override or Exclusion Value 258368.1 242002.8 388605.7 295787.0
(628684.8) (638294.1) (960733.3) (743075.0)
Unemployment 0.033* 0.037* 0.034 0.036
(0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
Lagged Education Share 0.491* 0.514* 0.506 0.518
(0.118) (0.106) (0.114) (0.111)
Lagged Public Works Share 0.095 0.098 0.092 0.092
(0.063) (0.059) (0.053) (0.056)
Lagged Public Safety Share 0.113 0.112 0.110 0.107
(0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046)
Lagged Health and Welfare Share 0.014* 0.013* 0.013 0.013
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Lagged Recreation and Culture Share 0.026* 0.019* 0.022 0.020
(0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
Lagged General Expenditures Share 0.071* 0.066* 0.069 0.067
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 1944 2587 356 309
*: Statistically different means at α = .1 (Standard deviation in parentheses.)
The observation counts listed are for budget observation numbers. There was a small number of extra obser-
vations available for non budget variables.
3.5 Results
With an RD method, the treated and untreated groups must be statistically in-
distinguishable prior to treatment, otherwise our results would likely be biased.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of select variables. As one would expect, sev-
eral variables, including population size, unemployment rate, and budget shares
for education, health and welfare, and recreation and culture are statistically
different when conditioning strictly upon vote passage or failure. This simply
demonstrates that these variables likely effect ballot initiative outcomes. How-
ever, upon conditioning not just on vote passage, but also on being relatively
near the discontinuity point, it can be seen that group differences become statis-
tically indistinct. The 5 percent bandwidth demonstrates that no variables pass
a differences in means test. Such an effect should be expected given that the
theory behind RD methodology implies that groups should be indistinguishable
when only considering close votes.
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Table 3.2: Budgetary response to ballot initiative success.
Public Public Health and Recreation and
Variable Education Works Safety Welfare Culture
Win 50% Bandwidth -0.074** 0.019** 0.013 0.001 -0.000
(0.030) (0.008) (0.013) (0.004) (0.003)
Win 100% Bandwidth -0.052** 0.014** 0.011 0.001 0.001
(0.022) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
Win 200% Bandwidth -0.032** 0.013** 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.017) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Base Bandwidth (%) 0.109 0.182 0.099 0.107 0.130
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (Standard deviation in parentheses.)
The RD methodology is first used on five individual measures of municipal
budget expenditure shares; education, public works, public safety, health and
welfare, and recreation and culture. These results for three bandwidth measures
are shown in Table 3.2.14 While there appears to be no statistically significant
change in public safety, health and welfare, or recreation and culture expendi-
tures, there is a statistically significant and negative effect on the budget share
of education expenditures and a positive effect on the public works expenditure
share. This is indicates that the passage of an override or capital exclusion vote
appears to reduce the share of expenditures devoted to education while raising
the share devoted to street, roads, and other public works projects, while having
little effect on other portions of the local budget.
These results suggest that education expenditure shares are falling by ap-
proximately 5 percent while public works spending is increasing by about 1.5
percent when a fiscal override or exclusion vote passes. This corresponds well
with the theory that under conditions of fiscal constraint, local budget officials
are choosing to increase expenditures in a more visible section of the munic-
ipal budget when given an increase in revenues. Importantly, as each vote is
required to have a listed usage on the ballot, there are more educational votes
14The different bandwidth measure are shown to demonstrate the robustness of the results.
As the chosen bandwidth shrinks, it tends to reduce bias and increase variance (Imbens and
Kalyanaraman, 2012).
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(20.2 percent) than public works votes (10.4 percent)15. With twice as many
educational votes occurring, this indicates that the findings are not likely to be
an artifact of simply having large numbers of public works votes tilting budget
shares.
Concentrating on just education and public works expenditures, these ef-
fects can then be broken down by override votes and capital exclusion votes.
The share of education expenditures is statistically significant and negatively
correlated with override passage as shown in Table 3.3, while the share of pub-
lic works spending is positively correlated with ballot passage. These findings
corroborate the overall effects found previously. However, as Table 3.4 provides,
exclusion votes are not statistically significantly correlated with budget share
changes16. In other words, budget officials appear to alter budget composition
when given permanent increases in revenue generation, but do not change their
behavior when considering temporary votes. This is robust to when using either
a local linear RD method or a high-order polynomial method.
Figure 3.4 provides a graphical representation of the override votes and their
subsequent effect on educational expenditures shares. The graphed lines shown
are the kernel-weighted polynomial regressions split between those overrides
that failed and those that passed. The discrete jump at 50 percent voter share
demonstrates the RD effect as expected, with those voting in the negative hav-
ing, on average, higher shares of education spending. Similarly, Figure 3.5 shows
15Unfortunately, the exact budgeted area an initiative will fall under is not ascribed by
Proposition 2 12 . Instead, the law requires that a description of the expected usage is to be
provided on the ballot. This makes it a somewhat arbitrary exercise in determining whether
a specific measure’s funding would be in one budget area versus another. To this end, certain
key words were used to help define where an initiative’s expenditures would likely fall. For
example, the words ‘education’ ‘elementary’ ‘school’ and ‘high school’ were used to identify
educational expenditures. Similar methodology was used to identify votes corresponding to
the five categories of interest.
16All five areas of municipal budgets were tested. None were found to be statistically
correlated with exclusion vote passage.
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Table 3.3: Budgetary response to override votes.
Education Public Works
Variable RD Polynomial RD Polynomial
Win -0.059** -0.043** 0.019** 0.018**
(0.027) (0.022) (0.007) (0.008)
Win 50% Bandwidth -0.081** 0.027***
(0.037) (0.009)
Win 200% Bandwidth -0.041** 0.018***
(0.021) (0.006)
Base Bandwidth 0.071 0.141
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (Standard deviation in parentheses.)
Table 3.4: Budgetary response to exclusion votes.
Education Public Works
Variable RD Polynomial RD Polynomial
Win -0.025 -0.048 -0.018 -0.017
(0.057) (0.048) (0.016) (0.019)
Win 50% Bandwidth -0.016 -0.024
(0.037) (0.020)
Win 200% Bandwidth 0.001 -0.023
(0.042) (0.014)
Base Bandwidth 0.109 0.365
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (Standard deviation in parentheses.)
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Figure 3.4: Educational expenditures compared to voter share.
how the share of public works expenditures follows a similar, but inverted rela-
tionship, with negative votes correlated with lower expenditure shares of public
works. Again, the discontinuity can be easily seen here.
However, while these results indicate that permanent increases to local levy
limits tend to result in budget composition changes, it does raise the question
of whether total expenditures are also being affected. If budget officials are
concerned about demonstrating their usage of override funds, then it would
seem unlikely that they should be willing to reduce real (dollar) expenditures in
education. Such a choice by local officials may be negatively perceived by the
local populace, whereas an increase in real expenditures to other portions of the
budget will reduce the share being spent on education, but may not necessarily
lead to a reduction in real educational expenditures.
To test whether officials are cutting educational budgets and not just shift-
ing expenditure shares, model (2) can be used with Yi representing the per
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Figure 3.5: Public works expenditures compared to voter share.
capita expenditures for the two areas of interest; education and public works.
Statistically insignificant results for education might indicate that local officials
are largely attempting to target marginal voters and thus, attempting to avoid
reducing utility levels for any group of citizens beyond the reduction already in-
curred by the passage of the override. Public works per capita spending should
be positively correlated with override wins, indicating that budget share move-
ment is less likely the result of a true reduction in expenditures, and more the
result of where officials prefer to spend funds given at least some amount of
budget fungibility.
Table 3.5 presents the results of using model (2) with per capita expenditures
as the outcome variable. Regardless of bandwidth size, per capita education ex-
penditures are positive, but statistically insignificant. This indicates that mu-
nicipalities may be reducing the share of educational spending in their budgets,
they don’t appear to be reducing real expenditure amounts. Per capita public
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Table 3.5: Per capita spending for override votes.
Education Public Works
Variable RD Polynomial RD Polynomial
Win 58.778 33.867 65.668*** 50.600**
(92.798) (77.174) (24.667) (20.973)
Win 50% Bandwidth 64.486 66.836**
(125.469) (24.154)
Win 200% Bandwidth 45.415 50.046**
(71.370) (22.048)
Base Bandwidth 0.108 0.098
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (Standard deviation in parentheses.)
works spending though, is statistically significant and positively correlated with
override passage. On average, an override passage will lead to an increase of
$66 in per capita public works spending. When considering both education and
public works spending, it would appear that municipalities are increasing public
works expenditures upon passing overrides, but that this increase is only limited
insofar as educational expenditures do not fall in real terms.
As a final robustness check, a similar method is used to examine capital ex-
clusion votes. Given previous results providing no statistical evidence for bud-
get response to exclusion vote passage, it should be expected that per capita
spending would also return statistically insignificant results. These results can
be found in Table 3.6. As expected, neither education or public works expen-
ditures on a per capita basis are statistically correlated with capital exclusion
passage. This provides more evidence that permanent increases in revenue ap-
pear to alter municipal budget composition, but temporary increases do not.
3.6 Conclusion
By utilizing data from Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 1
2
, the analysis here demon-
strates that fiscally constrained municipalities will react to revenue increases
91
Table 3.6: Per capita spending for exclusion votes.
Education Public Works
Variable RD Polynomial RD Polynomial
Win 229.177 125.362 -15.590 38.555
(413.673) (240.132) (97.477) (68.233)
Win 50% Bandwidth 400.115 43.594
(650.857) (163.883)
Win 200% Bandwidth 59.862 -48.117
(259.936) (66.412)
Base Bandwidth 0.102 0.137
*: p < 0.10 **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01 (Standard deviation in parentheses.)
through altering budget composition. Specifically, the share of educational ex-
penditures will tend to fall, while the share of public works spending will tend
to rise. The effect is not necessarily small, as an increase in the share of ex-
penditures by just 1.5 percent in Massachusetts is equivalent to a change of
nearly $200,000. Importantly though, this composition change does not appear
to come at the cost of real expenditures, as educational spending does not ap-
pear to fall in real terms, while public works expenditures increase in per capita
measures. Also, these effects occur only when considering permanent increases
in revenue generation rather than temporary measures.
Additionally, this analysis raises some concerns over budget fungibility in the
face of voter approved expenditures. Given that there are nearly twice as many
education overrides and exclusions than there are public works votes, it seems a
bit surprising to find a negative correlation between vote passage and the share
of educational expenditures. In other words, while by no means definitive, the
results shown demonstrate that even when voters approve additional education
expenditures, they may not be receiving the full (or even close to) the amount
that would have been listed on the ballot initiative. These findings indicate
that budget officials may not be providing the levels of expenditure that voters
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indicate they would prefer.
Understanding how municipalities respond under fiscal constraint is impor-
tant given the continued pressure in many locations across the country to keep
revenues low, thus possibly altering budget composition choices. With the rel-
atively ubiquitous nature of property tax caps, these results demonstrate the
importance of legislatively provided options for jurisdictions. Providing munic-
ipalities with permanent means of raising revenue beyond imposed levy limits
may tend to lead toward lower educational expenditures shares. This in turn
could have impacts at the state level as one might imagine municipalities re-
questing educational grants to cover share reductions in education. Based upon
the findings here, several avenues of additional research into budget fungibility
in own source revenue or state grant response to municipal fiscal constraints can
be explored. This paper provides economists with a better understanding of how
municipalities may respond to fiscal constraint, something which has been diffi-
cult to analyze in the past given problems in identifying fiscally constrained mu-
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